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This article discusses legal exit rights (referred to in the United States 
as appraisal rights and in civil law Europe as withdrawal rights), in the 
United States, France, and Romania.  We selected these three countries 
because they are representative of strong, average, and weak capital 
markets, respectively, with varying levels of shareholder activism and 
litigation (high, normal, and low, respectively).  In addition, the selection 
of these countries enabled us to compare the structure of legal exit rights in 
the United States and in Europe and, within Europe, between two 
politically, economically, and culturally sister countries (France and 
Romania) that nevertheless (and for no good reason) fundamentally diverge 
with respect to legal exit rights. 
Until recently, this topic had not received much attention in literature 
or in practice.  Now, in all three countries, it is raising passionate debates, 
albeit for different reasons, and we observed a recent and significant 
increase in the exercise of legal exit rights.  In the United States, a 
phenomenon of “appraisal activism” has emerged, led by specialized and 
aggressive hedge funds.  In France, shareholder activism, in general, is on 
the rise, and new regulations or proposals pertaining to legal exit rights 
have recently been adopted or are currently being debated.  In Romania, the 
second most important market was recently dissolved, a situation that has 
triggered legal exit rights at hundreds of public companies. 
The scope and procedures applicable to the exercise of legal exit rights 
differ greatly in the three countries analyzed.  That was easy to conclude.  
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While comparative law scholarship often has a tendency to emphasize 
differences between jurisdictions, we join an emerging trend in 
comparative law scholarship by choosing to focus on similarities.  
Consequently, the more difficult part of our analysis was to bring together, 
under an umbrella of common terminology and concepts, very different 
institutions, having separate sources and historical backgrounds.  We offer 
a common language and a general analytical framework for legal exit 
rights, from the pragmatic perspective of current practitioners in each of the 
countries surveyed.  In doing so, a certain extent of deliberate imprecision 
and generalization was unavoidable.  At the end of this process, and within 
the analytical framework created, we found that numerous similarities in 
the regulation of legal exit rights exist in these three countries.  We 
explored the identified similarities, which should allow each country to 
benefit from the experience of the others. 
In particular, our analysis indicates that the scope of legal exit rights 
for public companies is not correlated to the strength of the capital markets, 
and that shareholders are granted a broader scope of legal exit rights in 
private companies than in public companies (with the exception of France).  
It also indicates that there is extreme variation regarding exit rights for 
limited liability companies (almost exclusively contractual in the United 
States and France, while broad legal exit rights exist in Romania), and that 
there is generally less state intervention and more contractual freedom 
regarding the determination of the fair price with respect to companies 
other than joint stock companies.  Moreover, it indicates that the frequency 
of use of legal exit rights is not proportional to the level of shareholder 
litigation.
2016] SHAREHOLDER EXIT SIGNS 1061 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1062
I. LEGAL EXIT RIGHTS UNDER U.S. LAW................................................. 1065
A. Extraordinary Corporate Events ............................................ 1067
1.  Exit Rights in MBCA States for Corporations ............... 1067
2. Exit Rights in Delaware for Corporations ....................... 1069
B. Other Legal Exit Rights ......................................................... 1080
1. Absence of Specific Legal Exit Rights in Freeze-Out 
Transactions ..................................................................... 1080
2. Control Share Cash-Out Rights ....................................... 1081
II. LEGAL EXIT RIGHTS UNDER FRENCH LAW ......................................... 1083
A. Extraordinary Corporate Events ............................................ 1084
1.  Exit Rights in Connection with Specific Transactions 
or Corporate Events ......................................................... 1084
2. Exit Rights in Connection with Reaching Certain 
Ownership Thresholds ..................................................... 1091
B. Other Legal Exit Rights ......................................................... 1100
1. Exit Rights for Civil Companies ...................................... 1100
2. Exit Rights for Variable Capital Companies ................... 1103
III. LEGAL EXIT RIGHTS UNDER ROMANIAN LAW ................................... 1104
A. Extraordinary Corporate Events ............................................ 1104
1. Exit Rights for Private Joint Stock Companies ................ 1105
2. Exit Rights for Public Joint Stock Companies ................. 1113
B. Other Legal Exit Rights ......................................................... 1120
1. Exit Rights for Commercial Companies Other than 
Joint Stock Companies .................................................... 1121
2. Exit Rights for Civil Companies ...................................... 1122
IV. COMPARATIVE REMARKS .................................................................. 1123
A. Overview of Main Findings ................................................... 1123
1. Assessment of Correlation with Strength of Capital 
Markets ............................................................................ 1123
2. Assessment of Correlation with Shareholder Litigation .. 1125
B. Particular Findings ................................................................. 1126
1. Extraordinary Corporate Events that Trigger Legal Exit 
Rights ............................................................................... 1126
2. Determination of Fair Price ............................................... 1126
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 1129
APPENDIX................................................................................................. 1130
1062 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:4 
INTRODUCTION
Two of the core structural characteristics of a company1 are legal 
personality and limited liability, also described as “entity shielding” and 
“owner shielding”.  Entity shielding protects the assets of the company 
from the creditors of the company’s owners, while owner shielding protects 
the assets of the company’s owners from the creditors of the company.  A 
component of entity shielding, which serves to protect the going concern 
value of the company against destruction by either individual owners or 
their creditors, is that the individual owners of the company (the 
shareholders2) cannot withdraw their share of the company’s assets at will, 
thereby forcing partial or complete liquidation of the company, nor can the 
personal creditors of an individual owner foreclose on the owner’s share of 
the company’s assets.3  It follows that, unless a legal or contractual 
exception applies, shareholders may not abandon the company at will. 
At the origins of corporate law, shareholders had an absolute veto over 
extraordinary corporate events, which required unanimous approval.  
However, as this burdensome protection gave way to majority voting 
requirements, exit rights were granted as a compensation for the loss of the 
veto right.4  Consequently, legal exit rights are instances when the 
 1.  To increase readability, we use the term “company” to refer to a variety of business 
organizational forms in the three countries analyzed, which share all or most of the 
following main characteristics: (i) legal personality; (ii) limited liability; (iii) transferable 
shares; (iv) delegated management; and (v) shareholder ownership.  For the US, we use this 
term to refer to corporations and limited liability companies (to the exclusion of 
partnerships).  For France, we use this term to refer to (i) all forms of commercial 
companies, regulated by French corporate law (société anonyme, société par actions 
simplifiée, société à responsabilité limitée, société en nom collectif, société en commandite 
simple and société en commandite par actions) and (ii) civil companies (société civile),
regulated by French civil law.  For Romania, we use this term to refer to (i) all forms of 
commercial companies, regulated by Romanian corporate law (societate pe ac iuni,
societate cu r spundere limitat , societate în nume colectiv, societate în comandit  simpl
and societate în comandit  pe ac iuni) and (ii) civil companies (societate simpl ), regulated 
by Romanian civil law.  We refer to the Romanian societate pe ac iuni and to the French 
société par actions as “joint stock companies.”  We refer to limited liability companies in all 
three countries analyzed as “LLCs.” 
 2.  To increase readability, we use the term “shareholder” to refer generally to persons 
owning an interest in a company even if a different term is typically used in the relevant 
national provisions (for example, “stockholder” for Delaware corporations or “member” for 
LLCs).
 3.  Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law,
110 YALE L. J. 387, 411-13 (2000); see also Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, Richard 
Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (2006) (explaining the 
notions of “entity shielding” and “owner shielding”). 
 4.  See Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in 
Corporate Law, 84 GEO L. J. 1, 11-14 (1995) (providing an overview of the historical 
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applicable law provides that a shareholder has the right to exit the company 
and receive a fair price for its shares (also referred to as a sell-out right).  A 
sell-out right of a minority shareholder is sometimes paired with a 
correlative buy-out right of the majority shareholder.  In addition to, or 
instead of, legal exit rights, shareholders benefit sometimes from 
contractual exit rights.5  In contrast with legal exit rights, contractual exit 
rights are set forth in the bylaws or in shareholder agreements. 
This article discusses only legal exit rights, referred to in the U.S. as 
appraisal rights and in civil law Europe as withdrawal rights.  We analyze 
the structure of legal exit rights, as a minority shareholder protection, in the 
U.S., France, and Romania. 
We selected these three countries because they are representative of 
strong, average, and weak capital markets, respectively, with varying levels 
of shareholder activism and litigation (high, normal, and low, respectively).  
Additionally, the selection of these countries enabled us to broadly 
compare the structure of legal exit rights in the U.S. and the European 
Union (EU), France, and Romania (as the latter two are both EU member 
states).  Furthermore, by selecting France and Romania, we were able to 
explore the reason why two countries that are part of the same legal family 
(civil law) and have a very similar structure of their corporate law (due to 
strong political, economic, cultural and legislative influences) have 
nevertheless reached very different results regarding legal exit rights, 
including with respect to the implementation of relevant EU legislation, in 
particular, the Merger Directive6 and the Takeover Directive.7
The U.S. has very strong and active capital markets, with almost 2,000 
rationale for granting legal exit rights to shareholders); Barry M. Wertheimer, The
Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L. J. 
613, 618-19 (1998) (providing an overview of the courts’ process in determining fair value); 
see also Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n. 6 (1941) (explaining the 
fairness of exit rights for both majority and minority shareholders); Willcox v. Stern, 18 
N.Y.2d 195, 201-202 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966) (discussing the exit right as a fair means of 
compensating dissenting shareholders for majority, as opposed to unanimity, voting rule). 
 5.  Such contractual exit rights of a shareholder may include (i) the right to exit the 
company by selling its interest to the company or to the other shareholders (in proportion to 
their ownership interest) at either a pre-agreed price, as determined by a formula set out in 
the agreement, or at a price to be determined by an independent third party (a “put” right or 
a sell-out right, where the company or a majority shareholder generally has a correlative 
“call” right or buy-out right) or (ii) the right to sell a pro rata portion of its ownership 
interest to any third party acquiring the majority interest in the company (right of co-sale or 
tag-along right, where the majority shareholder generally has a correlative drag-along right). 
 6.  Directive 2011/35/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 
2011 concerning mergers of public limited liability companies, 2011 O.J. (L 110) 1, as 
subsequently amended. 
 7.  Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 
2004 on takeover bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12, as subsequently amended. 
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national companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange and another 
2,500 national companies listed on the Nasdaq Stock Exchange.  The level 
of shareholder litigation has always been very high.  More recently, 
shareholder activism in general has significantly increased, including by 
means of exercising legal exit rights, which have started being invoked 
frequently since 2011 despite not being particularly broad (a phenomenon 
referred to as “appraisal activism”). 
France has the second largest market capitalization in the EU, with 
over 600 companies listed on Euronext Paris, the main national stock 
exchange.  The level of shareholder litigation is higher than that in 
Romania, but lower than that in the U.S.  Over the past few years, France 
experienced a significant increase in shareholder activism.  Despite this 
general increase, shareholder legal exit rights remain narrow in scope and 
infrequently used or litigated. 
Romania has one of the lowest market capitalizations in the EU.  With 
less than 100 companies listed on the regulated market of the Bucharest 
Stock Exchange (BVB), the main national stock exchange, there is little 
capital market activity.  Shareholder litigation and activism are at low 
levels.  However, legal exit rights are broad and not infrequently used by 
shareholders.
The scope and procedures applicable to the exercise of legal exit rights 
differ greatly in the three countries analyzed.  That was easy to conclude.  
While comparative law scholarship often has a tendency to emphasize 
differences between jurisdictions, we join an emerging trend in 
comparative law scholarship by choosing to focus on similarities.  
Consequently, the more difficult part of our analysis was to bring together, 
under an umbrella of common terminology and concepts, very different 
institutions, each having separate sources and historical backgrounds.  We 
offer a common language and a general analytical framework for legal exit 
rights, from the pragmatic perspective of current practitioners in each of the 
countries surveyed.  In doing so, a certain extent of deliberate imprecision 
and generalization were unavoidable.  At the end of this process, and 
within the analytical framework created, we found that numerous 
similarities in the regulation of legal exit rights exist in these three 
countries.
Until recently, the topic of legal exit rights had not received much 
attention in literature or in practice.  Now, in all three countries, it is raising 
passionate debates, albeit for different reasons, and we observed a recent 
and significant increase in the exercise of legal exit rights.  In the U.S., 
while being criticized by many authors and practitioners, appraisal 
activism, led by specialized and aggressive hedge funds, is gaining 
increasing momentum (more than 17% of eligible transactions now attract 
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appraisal petitions, in addition to standard M&A shareholder litigation) and 
new categories of petitioners utilize it.  In France, shareholder activism in 
general is on the rise and new regulations or proposals pertaining to legal 
exit rights have recently been adopted or are currently being debated.  In 
Romania, the second most important stock market (the Rasdaq market of 
the BVB) has recently been dissolved after prolonged controversy 
regarding its legal status, which triggered potential legal exit rights at more 
than 800 companies and, in connection therewith, the adoption of new 
legislation, significant commentary and litigation. 
Our analysis indicates that the scope of legal exit rights for public 
companies8 is not correlated with the strength of the capital markets and 
that shareholders are granted a broader scope of legal exit rights in private 
companies than in public companies (with the exception of French 
companies).  It also indicates an extreme variation in exit rights for LLCs 
and the fact that the frequency of use of legal exit rights is not proportional 
to the level of shareholder litigation. 
This article proceeds as follows.  We first analyze the structure of 
legal exit rights in each of the three countries selected: the U.S. (Part I), 
France (Part II), and Romania (Part III).  We then present comparative 
remarks regarding the correlation between legal exit rights and the strength 
of capital markets and shareholder litigation, respectively.  We also provide 
observations regarding certain particularly important points on which the 
three countries we surveyed are widely divergent, namely the sphere of 
extraordinary corporate events that trigger legal exit rights (and how it 
correlates with types of companies) and the determination of the fair price 
(Part IV). 
I. LEGAL EXIT RIGHTS UNDER U.S. LAW
There are two main types of companies in the U.S.: corporations and 
LLCs.  Absent federal intervention, corporate law is left to the national 
legislators.  The national laws adopted by Delaware are particularly 
important because Delaware is the privileged venue for company 
incorporations, and, consequently, for shareholder litigation.  More than 
one million companies are incorporated in Delaware, including more than 
50% of all public companies and more than 60% of the Fortune 500 
companies.9
 8.  We use the term “public companies” to refer to companies with securities listed on 
a stock exchange. 
 9.  See About Agency, State of Delaware, Division of Corporations, 
http://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml [https://perma.cc/J6P4-9BHZ] (noting the 
current number of Delaware corporations) (all links in this article were visited on July 14, 
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With respect to corporations, approximately half of the U.S. states 
follow the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), with certain national 
variations.  Notably, California, Delaware, New Jersey, New York and 
Texas do not follow the MBCA.  In Delaware, the Delaware General 
Corporation Law (DGCL) applies to both private and public corporations. 
With respect to LLCs, there is a more pronounced variation at the 
national level.  There is also a model law for LLCs, the Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act, but only a minority of U.S. states have adopted it.  
In Delaware, LLCs are governed by the Delaware Limited Liability 
Company Act (DLLCA). 
There are generally no legal exit rights for LLCs in the U.S. because 
this form of company is regarded inherently as a “creature of contract” and 
regulated accordingly.  Only a small minority of U.S. states (for example, 
California, Florida, Minnesota and New York) grant legal exit rights for 
LLCs.10 but in U.S. states where there are no legal exit rights for LLCs, 
courts might accept a determination of fair value of the shares by applying 
the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  As such, 
exit rights for shareholders of LLCs generally exist only if, and to the 
extent, provided in the LLC agreement or in an agreement governing a 
specific corporate transaction.  For example, the DLLCA allows for broad 
contractual exit rights in case of LLCs: 
A limited liability company agreement or an agreement of merger 
or consolidation or a plan of merger may provide that contractual 
appraisal rights with respect to a limited liability company 
interest or another interest in a limited liability company shall be 
available for any class or group or series of members or limited 
liability company interests in connection with any amendment of 
a limited liability company agreement, any merger or 
consolidation in which the limited liability company is a 
constituent party to the merger or consolidation, any conversion 
of the limited liability company to another business form, any 
transfer to or domestication or continuance in any jurisdiction by 
the limited liability company, or the sale of all or substantially all 
2016.); for a historical perspective on the evolution of the number of Delaware corporations, 
see generally Roberta Romano, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14 (1993);
Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1571 
(2002); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L.
& ECON. 383, 389-91 (2003). 
 10.  See, e.g., N.Y. LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LAW §1002 (Procedures for merger or 
consolidation) and §509 (Distribution upon withdrawal) (noting the right to receive “fair 
value of [the] membership interest in the limited liability company” in case of a merger or 
consolidation or in case of withdrawal).  For a rare example of exercise of this legal exit 
right in an LLC, see Stulman v. John Dory LLC, 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6938 (Sup. Ct. 
New York County Sept. 10, 2010).  
2016] SHAREHOLDER EXIT SIGNS 1067 
of the limited liability company’s assets. The Court of Chancery 
shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter relating 
to any such appraisal rights.11
Below, we discuss only legal exit rights (“appraisal rights”)12
applicable to corporations.  Even for corporations, shareholder protection is 
typically ensured by contractual, rather than legal, exit rights.  Legal exit 
rights typically apply only to certain extraordinary corporate events 
(discussed here in Section A) and U.S. law provides for only a few other 
legal exit rights (discussed here in Section B). 
A. Extraordinary Corporate Events 
There are notable differences between MBCA states (Section 1) and 
non-MBCA states, in particular, Delaware (Section 2), regarding exit rights 
applicable in case of extraordinary corporate events, especially with respect 
to the scope of the right and the procedure. 
1. Exit Rights in MBCA States for Corporations
(a) Scope.  Pursuant to Section 13.02(a) of the MBCA,13 a shareholder 
is entitled to obtain payment of the “fair value” of that shareholder’s shares, 
 11.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §18-210 (2016). 
 12.  For an overview of the appraisal remedy under U.S. law and its evolution see 
generally Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank 
Coker, 72 YALE L. J. 223, 255 (1962); Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares 
in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 304 (1974); Elliott J. Weiss, 
The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624 (1981); 
Elliott J. Weiss, Balancing Interests in Cash-Out Mergers: The Promise of Weinberger v. 
UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1983); Daniel R. Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in 
Corporate Law, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 875; Joel Seligman, Reappraising the 
Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829 (1984); Alexander Khutorsky, Note, Coming 
in From the Cold: Reforming Shareholders’ Appraisal Rights in Freeze-out Transactions,
1997 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 133, 133-37 (1997); Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of 
Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority 
Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425 (1990); Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and 
Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO L. J. 1 (1995); Mary Siegel, 
Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 79
(1995); Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts 
Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L. J. 613, 618-19 (1998); J. Travis Laster, The Appraisal 
Remedy in Third Party Deals, 18 M&A INSIGHTS 4 (Apr. 2004); Lawrence Hammermesch & 
Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields in Delaware Appraisal Law, 31 DEL.
JOURNAL OF CORP. LAW 101 (2005); James C. Morphy, Doing Away With Appraisal in 
Public Deals, 26 DEL. LAW. 30 (2008). 
 13.  See Mary Siegel, An Appraisal of the Model Business Corporation Act’s Appraisal 
Rights Provisions, 74 L. CONTEMP. PROB. 231 (2011) (providing an overview of relevant 
MBCA provisions). 
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in the event of any of the following extraordinary corporate events: (i) 
merger to which the company is a party, if shareholder approval is required 
for the merger; (ii) share exchange to which the company is a party as the 
company whose shares will be acquired, or disposition of assets, if the 
shareholder is entitled to vote on the share exchange or disposition; (iii) 
any amendment to the articles of incorporation, including an amendment 
that reduces the number of shares of a class or series owned by the 
shareholder to a fraction of a share if the company has the obligation or 
right to repurchase the fractional share so created,;(iv) domestication, if the 
shareholder does not receive shares in the foreign company resulting from 
the domestication that have terms as favorable to the shareholder in all 
material respects and represent at least the same percentage interest of the 
total voting rights as the shares held by the shareholder before the 
domestication; or (v) conversion to a nonprofit or unincorporated entity. 
Therefore, under the MBCA, the shareholders whose votes are 
required to implement the extraordinary corporate event can dissent and 
exercise their appraisal rights.  This means that the shareholders of the 
target company (rather than of the buyer) are those who can usually 
exercise the appraisal right.  Direct mergers are among the limited cases 
where the buyer’s shareholders have an appraisal right because they have a 
vote to approve the transaction.  In those U.S. states where the buyer must 
obtain shareholder approval if it is issuing a significant amount of its stock 
to acquire the target company (in an all-stock or cash and stock 
transaction), the buyer’s shareholders might also have appraisal rights. 
(b) Market-out exception.  Section 13.02(b)(1) of the MBCA provides 
that appraisal rights are not available for holders of shares of (i) a public 
company or (ii) a company that has at least 2,000 shareholders and a 
market value of at least $20 million.  This exception presumes that 
shareholders do not need an appraisal right if there is a public and liquid 
market for their shares.  If they disagree with the change envisioned, 
shareholders can sell their shares in the open market for the market value 
rather than involve the courts.  Indeed, dissenting shareholders of a public 
company who disapprove of a proposed change will generally have little 
difficulty selling their shares on the market.  That is because, in the case of 
a merger, the market often responds favorably (with a rise of the stock 
price), and because buyers generally price their offers above the market 
price in order to attract shareholders to approve the merger.  Therefore, 
dissenting shareholders to the merger of a public company not only have a 
liquid market on which to sell their shares, they have a stimulated market.14
 14.  See Thompson, supra note 4 at 10, 29-30 (observing that approximately half of 
U.S. states do not grant appraisal rights if there is a liquid market on which the shareholders 
may sell their shares). 
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When the market-out exception is triggered, appraisal rights are 
restored in certain circumstances (the exception to the exception).  Sections 
13.02(b)(3) and 13.02(b)(4) of the MBCA provide that holders of shares in 
a public or widely held company regain appraisal rights (i) if such holders 
must accept for their shares anything other than cash or shares in a public 
or widely-held company or (ii) in case of interested transactions. 
(c) Procedure.  The procedural conditions for exercising appraisal 
rights are very similar in both MBCA states and non-MBCA states, but 
there are certain subtle differences.  In general, most U.S. states require that 
the dissenting shareholder (i) give notice that it is exercising its right before 
the transaction is submitted to the shareholders for approval; (ii) not vote in 
favor of the transactions (some states requiring the shareholder to cast a 
“no” vote and others allowing also an abstention from voting); (iii) submit 
all the shareholder’s shares of the company for appraisal (not retain any 
shares); and (iv) be a record holder of shares of the company.  Some non-
MBCA states also allow beneficial owners to exercise appraisal rights 
under certain circumstances (for example, Delaware, New Jersey and New 
York).
A significant point where the U.S. states differ is whether or not the 
company is required to make an offer to the dissenting shareholder before 
the court proceedings resulting in a judicial determination of “fair value” of 
the shares may start.  For example, in New York, the company must make a 
written offer to the dissenting shareholders for an amount, in cash, that the 
company believes is the fair value of the shares and accompany its offer by 
(i) an advance payment (equal to 80% of the offer amount) and (ii) the 
company’s balance sheet or profit and loss statement.  The offer must be 
the same for all dissenting shareholders and the company may not negotiate 
different prices with different shareholders.  The court proceedings are then 
triggered only with respect to the dissenting shareholders who did not 
accept the offer.15
2. Exit Rights in Delaware for Corporations
(a) Scope. Section 262(a) of the DGCL16 provides that: 
[a]ny stockholder of a corporation of this State who holds shares 
of stock on the date of the making of a demand pursuant to 
subsection (d) of this section with respect to such shares, who 
continuously holds such shares through the effective date of the 
merger or consolidation, who has otherwise complied with 
subsection (d) of this section and who has neither voted in favor 
 15.  N.Y. BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW § 623(g) (2016). 
 16.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2016). 
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of the merger or consolidation nor consented thereto in 
writing . . . shall be entitled to an appraisal by the Court of 
Chancery of  the fair value of the stockholder’s shares of stock. 
It is readily apparent that the scope of the Delaware appraisal right is 
much narrower than that existing in MBCA states.  It covers only mergers 
and consolidations.  However, Section 262(c) of the DGCL allows 
Delaware corporations to provide in their certificate of incorporation that 
appraisal rights will exist for any amendments of the certificate of 
incorporation (whether or not in connection with a merger or 
consolidation); any merger or consolidation (irrespective of the form of 
consideration); or a sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the 
company. 
The Delaware appraisal right does not cover a sale of assets, a 
frequently used deal structure as an alternative to a merger or a sale of 
shares.  We have seen that a sale of assets results in appraisal rights in 
MBCA states.  It also results in appraisal rights in a majority of non-
MBCA states.  For example, in New York, a non-MBCA state, appraisal 
rights also exist for any “sale, lease exchange or other disposition of all or 
substantially all of the assets” which requires shareholder approval, with 
certain exceptions.17  In Delaware, an appraisal right exists for sales of 
assets only as a contractual protection. 
With respect to the scope of the appraisal right in case of mergers, its 
availability typically depends on the existence, under the relevant 
provisions, of a shareholder vote.  Therefore, appraisal rights do not exist 
for statutory mergers under Sections 251(f) and 251(g) of the DGCL.  Two 
exceptions are however provided by the DGCL. 
(i) Second-step mergers.  Section 251(h) of the DGCL dispenses of 
the requirement of a shareholder vote for acquisitions structured as a public 
offer for all the shares of the target company followed by a second-step 
merger for all remaining shares, if certain requirements are met.  The target 
must be a public or widely held company, the number of shares tendered in 
the offer plus the shares owned by the buyer must be at least equal to that 
which would have been required for shareholder approval of the merger, 
and, most importantly, the same nature and amount of consideration must 
apply to both the offer and the second-step merger.  Despite the lack of a 
shareholder vote, appraisal rights exist for such second-step mergers. 
(ii) Squeeze-out mergers.  Section 253 of the DGCL allows a 
shareholder who owns at least 90% of a company to squeeze-out the 
remaining minority shareholders by means of a merger (commonly referred 
to as a “short-form” merger), without a vote.  Appraisal rights are available 
 17.  N.Y. BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW § 910(a)(1)(B) (2016). 
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in such short-form mergers, whether the 90% threshold is reached as a 
result of a change of control transaction, such as a public offer, or 
independently thereof.18
(b) Market-out exception.  Section 262(b)(1) of the DGCL contains a 
market-out exception similar to that found in the MBCA.  Holders of shares 
of a company listed on a national securities exchange or widely held (by 
more than 2,000 holders of record) do not have an appraisal right.  The 
DGCL also contains the related exception to the exception, in the sense 
that, pursuant to Section 262(b)(2) of the DGCL, the appraisal right 
becomes applicable again to such holders if they have to accept anything 
other than stock of the surviving company or of any other public or widely 
held company.  Therefore, holders of shares of a company listed on a 
national securities exchange or widely-held will have appraisal rights if 
they receive in the transaction either all cash or a combination of cash and 
stock and, in this second case, only if they cannot make an election 
between cash and stock.19  The restoration of appraisal rights in case cash is 
received in the transaction (which does not occur in MBCA states) does not 
make much sense because cash is by definition more liquid than any 
stock.20
(c) Procedure.  In Delaware, shareholders who own shares as of the 
 18.  REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW. A COMPARATIVE 
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, 202-04, 263-65 (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed. 2009). 
 19.  Krieger v. Wesco Financial Corp., 30 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2011) (stating that 
shareholders did not have appraisal rights because the consideration was either cash or stock 
of the surviving company, or a mix of cash and stock, at the election of the shareholder, with 
cash being paid to the shareholders who failed to make an election); Louisiana Municipal 
Police Employees’ Retirement System v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172 (Del. Ch. 2007) (stating 
that shareholders did have appraisal rights because the consideration included a mix of cash 
and stock, the cash portion consisting of a dividend, and the shareholders could not make an 
election). 
 20.  For discussions regarding the rationale, scope and utility of the market-out 
exception, see Wertheimer, supra note 4 at 633; David J. Ratway, Delaware’s Stock Market 
Exception to Appraisal Rights: Dissenting Minority Stockholders of Warner 
Communications, Inc. are “Market-Out” of Luck, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 179, 205 (1994) 
(stating that “proponents of the ‘market-out’ exception claim that with a publicly-traded 
stock, the stock market price is an accurate and fair valuation of the stock.  Therefore, 
expensive judicial determination of the fair value would be redundant.”); Michael R. 
Schwenk, Valuation Problems in the Appraisal Remedy, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 649, 681-82 
(1994) (stating that “if the shareholder can receive the fair value of his or her stock by 
selling it in the market, then there is no need for a judicial proceeding to determine this 
value.  It has already been set with the best source of information regarding values: a 
competitive market.”); Jeff Goetz, Note, A Dissent Dampened by Timing: How the Stock 
Market Exception Systematically Deprives Public Shareholders of Fair Value, 15 FORDHAM 
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 771, 787-88 (2010) (arguing that “valuation through appraisal is 
unnecessary because dissenting shareholders can sell their shares on the market for the 
appropriate price”). 
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record date for the vote on a merger (which is typically 60 days before the 
general meeting), as well as those who buy shares after the record date but 
prior to the general meeting, may request appraisal.  Indeed, in a 2007 
decision of the Court of Chancery,21 the court held, against expectations, 
that investors that buy target company shares after the record date for the 
vote on a merger can assert appraisal rights, allowing potential petitioners 
to delay a decision on whether to buy target company stock for the purpose 
of pursuing an appraisal action until the date of the general meeting. 
The requirements for the exercise of the appraisal right are relatively 
convoluted and the procedural burdens of preserving and asserting the 
appraisal remedy are significant. 
First, the shareholder who wishes to exercise its appraisal right must 
deliver to the company, before the vote, a written demand.  The demand 
must reasonably inform the company of the identity of the shareholder and 
that it intends to demand the appraisal of its shares. 
Second, the shareholder must not vote in favor of the merger.  It must 
vote against the merger or abstain from voting (or, as it sometimes 
happens, vote in favor just enough shares to get the merger approved and 
abstain with respect to the rest of the shares22).  It is not always possible for 
the shareholder who seeks appraisal to demonstrate that none of the shares 
for which appraisal is sought were voted in favor of the merger.  
Nonetheless, the Court of Chancery permitted appraisal to be pursued even 
where the petitioner was unable to show that the shares for which it sought 
appraisal had not been voted in favor of the merger by the previous owner.  
Two decisions of the Court of Chancery have recently reconfirmed this 
approach.23
Third, within 120 days of the effective date of the merger, the 
shareholder must file a petition for appraisal or join an appraisal proceeding 
commenced by another petitioner.  Such petitions are heard in Delaware 
exclusively by the Court of Chancery.  Alternatively, at any time within 60 
days of the effective date of the merger, the shareholder may withdraw its 
demand and accept the merger price, if the shareholder had not commenced 
or joined an appraisal proceeding. 
Fourth, the shareholder must continuously hold the shares for which 
 21.  In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 22.  It appears that at the general meeting called to vote on the merger Broadridge 
(frequently hired to assist companies with their shareholder communications and 
distribution of proxy materials, as well as with the organization of their general meetings 
and vote tabulation) provides less information in case of contested transactions than in case 
of uncontested transactions. 
 23.  In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 66825 (Del. Ch. 
Jan. 5, 2015); Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., No. 8900-VCG, 2015 WL 67586 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015). 
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appraisal is sought through the effective date of the merger and cannot, for 
the duration of the appraisal proceedings, vote such shares or receive 
dividends. 
Appraisal proceedings are lengthy.  They usually last 2-4 years and 
include extensive testimony from financial experts.  Consequently, they are 
also expensive.  Contrary to standard M&A shareholder litigation, appraisal 
petitioners may not proceed as a class and, therefore, may not shift their 
attorney’s fees to all shareholders or to the defendants.  Section 262(j) of 
the DGCL provides that the costs of the proceeding will be taxed upon the 
parties as the court deems equitable and that the court may order that the 
(reasonable) expenses incurred by any shareholder be charged pro rata 
against the value of all the shares entitled to appraisal. 
The remedy in appraisal proceedings is “fair value” of the shares plus 
interest.  Pursuant to Section 262(h) of the DGCL, the Court of Chancery 
determines “the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value 
arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or 
consolidation, together with interest.”  Therefore, fair value is the going 
concern value of the company assuming the transaction had not occurred 
(excluding the value of synergies and a control premium).  The 
methodology most often used to determine the going concern value is a 
DCF analysis.  In determining the fair value, Section 262(h) of the DGCL 
requires the court to “take into account all relevant factors.”  The Court of 
Chancery has leeway and a demonstrated willingness to consider a wide 
variety of arguments as to fair value. 
A survey of certain post-trial appraisal decisions shows that the 
court’s determination of fair value was higher than the merger price in 77% 
of the cases, with premiums ranging from approximately 9% to 150% and 
averaging 61% (81% for interested transactions) in transactions where there 
was a premium.24  The numerical results of this survey are to be taken with 
a grain of salt because the study only covered 4.5 years of post-trial 
appraisal decisions (2010 to June 2014) and the sample was small (only 
 24.  Fried, Frank, Harris, Shiver & Jacobson LLP, New Activist Weapon—The Rise of 
Delaware Appraisal Arbitrage: A Survey of Cases and Some Practical Implications (June 
18, 2014), Columbia Law School Blog on Corporations and the Capital Markets, 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/07/09/fried-frank-discusses-delaware-appraisal-
arbitrage-as-a-new-activist-weapon/ [https://perma.cc/NQ8L-9G74].  See also Fried, Frank, 
Harris, Shiver & Jacobson LLP, Why Delaware Appraisal Awards Exceed the Merger 
Price—The Gap Between What the Delaware Chancery Court Says and Does (Sept. 23, 
2014), Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/09/23/why-delaware-appraisal-awards-exceed-
the-merger-price/ [https://perma.cc/ZN2W-72EX] (observing that the premium for the five 
interested transactions was 75.5%, 127.8%, 19.8%, 19.5% and 148.8% and that the premium 
for the four interested transactions was 0%, 8.5%, 15.6% and (14.4%)). 
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nine decisions).  Additionally, the idea that the exercise of appraisal rights 
by shareholders of public companies results in a value consistently and 
significantly higher than the merger price is troubling in light of the theory 
of efficient markets.  Moreover, in 2015, despite an older ruling of the 
Delaware Supreme Court that in determining fair value in appraisal 
proceedings the Court of Chancery may not defer, even presumptively, to 
the merger price,25 the Court of Chancery issued a series of decisions (one 
of which was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court) where it found that 
the merger price was the most reliable and probative indicator of fair 
value.26  Importantly, the merger price in all these cases was established 
following an arm’s length, thorough and informed sales process, which 
allowed the Court of Chancery to rely on the merger price and to reject 
both parties’ expert valuations. 
The idea that the exercise of appraisal rights by shareholders of public 
companies results in a value consistently and significantly higher than the 
merger price is troubling in light of the theory of efficient markets.  This 
theory stipulates that shares always trade at their fair value on capital 
markets because, in efficient capital markets, the trading prices always 
incorporate and reflect all relevant information.  The merger price is 
typically already at a premium to the trading price, in order to be attractive.  
It is, therefore, counterintuitive that the “fair price” determined in appraisal 
proceedings would be higher than the merger price.27  An explanation for 
this abnormality is that appraisal rights are often exercised in connection 
with interested transactions or transactions with flawed sales processes, to 
which the theory of efficient markets does not, by definition, apply. 
Whether, and to what extent, the merger price is, can, or will be taken 
into account in determining fair value in appraisal litigation is still 
uncertain.  The Delaware Supreme Court held that in determining fair value 
the Court of Chancery may not defer, even presumptively, to the merger 
price.28  However, in two recent decisions (one of which was affirmed by 
 25.  Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010).  
 26.  Huff Fund Investment Partnership v. CKx, Inc., No. 6844-VCG, 2013 WL 
5878807 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013) (aff’d Huff Fund Investment Partnership v. CKx, Inc., 
2015 WL 631586 (Del. 2015)); In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com Inc., No. 8173-VCG, 2015 
WL 399726 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015); Merlin Partners LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., No. 8509-VCN, 
2015 WL 2069417 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015); LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., 
No. 8094-VCP, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015); Merion Capital LP v. 
BMC Software, Inc., No. 8900-VCG, 2015 WL 6164771 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015). See also
Van de Walle v. Unimation, Inc., Civ. A. No. 7046, 1991 WL 29303, at *17 (Del. Ch. Mar. 
7, 1991) (stating that “[t]he fact that a transaction price was forged in the crucible of 
objective market reality (as distinguished from the unavoidably subjective thought process 
of a valuation expert) is viewed as strong evidence that the price is fair”). 
 27.  Hammermesch & Wachter, supra note 12, at 119. 
 28.  Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010).  
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the Delaware Supreme Court), the Court of Chancery found that the merger 
price was the most reliable and probative indicator of fair value, and 
rejected each party’s expert valuations.  The court noted that the sales 
process had been robust and included “a full market canvas and auction.” 
In principle, interest is added to the fair value determined, for the 
period between the effective date of the merger and the date of payment.  
The applicable interest rate is established in Section 262(h) of the DGCL as 
“5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate”, resulting in an interest rate 
well-above market.  The current Federal Reserve discount rate, as of 
December 17, 2015, is 1% for primary credit,29 which puts the “appraisal 
interest rate” at 6%.  Section 262(h) of the DGCL authorizes the Court of 
Chancery to determine “in its discretion [. . .] for good cause shown” that 
interest will not be added to the fair value.  So far, the Court of Chancery 
has refused to exercise its discretion to establish a different interest rate 
than the statutory rate.30
(d) Recent trends.  The rational assumption would be that appraisal 
rights are most useful to, and, consequently, used by, private company 
shareholders, because they do not have a liquid market for their shares and 
because the market-out exception removes appraisal rights for shareholders 
of public companies in certain cases.  However, the opposite is true in 
practice: the appraisal procedure is mostly used by shareholders of public 
companies.  That is because specialized hedge funds and other institutional 
shareholders recently discovered the monetary and procedural advantages 
of the appraisal procedure as applied to public companies. 
The main monetary advantage is that, as discussed above, the fair 
value determined in the appraisal proceedings is often much higher than the 
merger price and interest at a rate well above market is automatically added 
to this fair value for the (long) duration of the proceedings. 
The main procedural advantage is that shares acquired after the public 
announcement of a transaction are eligible for appraisal and those who 
want to exercise appraisal rights can buy shares on the market after the 
announcement, with the benefit of, and sufficient time to examine, public 
filings which contain information regarding the sale process and valuation 
metrics, including those employed by experts who are invariably hired to 
render fairness opinions (although they are not mandatory under either 
 29.  See https://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/Pages/Discount-Rates/Current-Discount-
Rates.aspx [https://perma.cc/EW78-85XK] (listing current discount rates).  
 30.  In re Appraisal of Metromedia Int’l Group, Inc., 971 A.2d 893, 907 (Del. Ch. 
2009) (noting that “a different rate may be justified where it is necessary to avoid an 
inequitable result, such as where there has been improper delay or a bad faith assertion of 
valuation claims”). 
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federal or state law31).  In addition, appraisal is a low cost weapon to 
exerting pressure.  The procedure allows shareholders to threaten 
exercising appraisal rights without later following through, providing them 
with deal blocking potential and negotiation leverage (they can threaten to 
make a demand but not ultimately make it, make a demand but then not 
bring a formal appraisal, or abandon a petition after it is filed, choosing to 
take the merger price instead of pursuing the appraisal claim). 
Another procedural advantage is that, in contrast with M&A 
shareholder litigation for breach of fiduciary duties by the board, plaintiffs 
in appraisal claims need not allege or prove any wrongdoing in connection 
with the transaction or flaws in the sale process.  Consequently, it is easier 
to pursue an appraisal claim than a fiduciary duty claim.  Often, both are 
pursued jointly. 
These advantages were discovered recently.  Until a few years ago, 
appraisal was perceived as a useless and inefficient remedy “of virtually no 
economic advantage,”32 and was rarely used.  The percentage of appraisal-
eligible transactions that attracted at least one appraisal petition evolved in 
Delaware as follows: 5% (from 2004 to 2010), 12% (in 2011 and 2012) and 
17% (in 2013, although there was not a similarly substantial increase in 
M&A activity).  In 2013, the value of the dissenting shares was almost $1.5 
billion, nearly three times the amount involved in any prior year from 2004 
to 2013, and the percentage of the equity value of the shares that sought 
appraisal out of the equity value of all appraisal-eligible transactions was 
almost 1%.33  The increase came almost exclusively from appraisal 
petitions involving public companies and is expected to continue and 
amplify in the future.  The most vulnerable transactions are all cash 
mergers where the price appears to significantly undervalue the company 
 31.  If a fairness opinion was obtained, the evaluation methods and the results thereof 
must be summarized in great detail in the proxy statement.  The summary must include the 
procedures followed, the findings and recommendations, the bases for and methods of 
arriving at such findings and recommendations, and other elements.  See Item 14(b)(6) of 
SEC Schedule 14A (cross-referencing Item 1015(b) of SEC Regulation M-A). 
 32.  Manning, supra note 12, at 260. See also Lucian Arye Bebchuck, Limiting
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter 
Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1852-56 (1989); JAMES D. COX, THOMAS LEE HAZEN 
& F. HODGE O’NEAL, CORPORATIONS 595-96 (1997) (asserting that “[appraisal] is rarely the 
remedy of other than the ‘wine and cheese’ crowd, for seldom is appraisal sought by 
investors whose holdings are less than $100,000”). 
 33.  Minor Myers & Charles R. Korsmo, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public 
Company M&A, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2424935 
[https://perma.cc/GS4N-TUJE] (April 14, 2014), at 14-18. But see Paul G. Mahoney & 
Mark Weinstein, The Appraisal Remedy and Merger Premiums, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 239, 
242 (1999) (finding no evidence that the availability of appraisal is associated with higher 
merger premiums for target shareholders). 
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(by 20-30%), in particular take private and other interested transactions (for 
example, where there is no market check or majority of minority approval).  
Recent public company transactions that attracted significant appraisal 
litigation are, for example, the Dell and Dole Food take private transactions 
in 2013, the Ancestry.com take private transaction in 2012, and the sale of 
3M to Cogent in 2010.34
This recent rise in appraisal litigation involving public companies is 
referred to as “appraisal activism.”35  Although the percentage of 
transactions attracting appraisal litigation (17% in 2013) might not seem 
high in absolute terms, or relative to the percentage of transactions 
attracting M&A shareholder litigation (93% in 201336), it is nevertheless 
problematic.  Appraisal litigation is undoubtedly a lucrative enterprise for 
petitioners (who have become increasingly sophisticated), but it has 
nefarious consequences for (public) companies and overloads the dockets 
of the Delaware judges, who have to spend a significant portion of their 
 34.  See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 66825 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015); Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., No. 8900-VCG, 2015 
WL 67586 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015); In re Appraisal of Dole Food Co., 114 A.3d 541 (Del. 
Ch. 2014). 
 35.  For more details regarding the rise of appraisal activism in the U.S. and its 
consequences, see generally Raluca Papadima, Appraisal Activism in M&A Deals: Recent 
Developments in the United States and the EU, 4 EUR. COMPANY L. 188, 190-192 (2015); 
Steven Davidoff Solomon, A New Form of Shareholder Activism Gains Momentum, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2014; Miles Weiss, Dell Value Dispute Spotlights Rise in Appraisal 
Arbitrage, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 3, 2013; George S. Geis, An Appraisal Puzzle, 105 NW.
U. L. REV. 1635 (2011). 
 36.  Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2015,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2715890 [https://perma.cc/7A3R-RECH] (Jan. 14, 
2016).  The study considered all completed transactions of at least $100 million where the 
target was a publicly traded Delaware and non-Delaware company.  The authors observed 
that the percentage of transactions attracting M&A shareholder litigation evolved as 
follows: 39.3% in 2005, 87.3% in 2010, 91.4% in 2011, 91.8% in 2012, 93.2% in 2013, 
94.9% in 2014, and 87.7% in 2015.  Although the 2015 numbers are preliminary, the 
significant decrease in 2015 can be explained by Delaware’s sharp turn against disclosure-
only settlements starting in the second half of 2015 and culminating with the Trulia decision 
in January 2016.  See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 
2016) (explaining that “practitioners should expect that disclosure settlements are likely to 
be met with continued disfavor in the future unless the supplemental disclosures address a 
plainly material misrepresentation or omission, and the subject matter of the proposed 
release is narrowly circumscribed to encompass nothing more than disclosure claims and 
fiduciary duty claims concerning the sale process, if the record shows that such claims have 
been investigated sufficiently”).  This turn may create seismic shifts in M&A shareholder 
litigation in Delaware.  For the reasons leading to this development, see Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. 
Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger 
Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557 (2015) 
(finding weak support that amendment settlements increase shareholder voting in favor of a 
transaction and no support that disclosure-only settlements do not affect shareholder voting). 
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time playing investment banker without commensurate compensation. 
(i) Emergence of institutional appraisal activists.  Since 2011, more 
than 80% of appraisal proceedings involved a petitioner who had 
previously filed an appraisal petition.37  The most important repeat 
petitioners are the following “magnificent seven” funds, all of which 
specialize in appraisal arbitrage: Magnetar, Merlin (which has the most 
petitions filed), Merion (which has reportedly raised a billion dollars to 
invest in appraisal claims), Patchin, Predica, Quadre, and Verition. 
Recently, other types of institutional investors have started taking part 
in appraisal litigation: other hedge funds (Fortress, Hudson Bay, TIG 
Advisors); mutual funds (which had previously only rarely been involved 
in standard M&A shareholder litigation; for example, T. Rowe Price and 
John Hancock in connection with the Dell appraisal litigation); and 
insurance companies (also rarely involved in standard M&A shareholder 
litigation in the past; for example, Prudential and Northwestern Mutual also 
in connection with the Dell appraisal litigation). 
Initially, appraisal was largely a one-off exercise for a particular 
aggrieved shareholder or a repeat player acting as a lone wolf.  More 
recently, specialized funds and other institutional shareholders with 
important financial resources tend to regroup and target the same deals.  
This wolf-packing tendency can be observed in particular among 
specialized plaintiffs, with the pair Merion/Magnetar (for example, the 
appraisal litigation involving Cogent and Dole Food) and the pair 
Merlin/Quadre (for example, the appraisal litigation involving Orchard 
Enterprises, Bronco Drilling, Official Payments, and Cornerstone 
Therapeutics) often seen targeting the same deals. 
(ii) Implications of appraisal activism for targets, buyers and their 
financial advisors.  The threat of appraisal litigation has started to affect the 
dynamics surrounding the negotiation of merger transactions, as it can have 
a significant effect on the price ultimately paid in the transaction, as well as 
deal-threatening potential by reducing closing certainty. 
( ) Effect on price.  It is likely that buyers will respond to the recent 
rise in appraisal activism by lowering the price payable to all shareholders 
and holding back some incremental value for the appraisal activists (in 
contrast to M&A shareholder litigation where all shareholders share in any 
incremental value paid by the buyer).  At first glance, it seems that buyers 
should build into their financial models the possibility of an appraisal 
award as a post-closing cost.  However, such an approach presents several 
disadvantages.  First, it can significantly decrease bid competitiveness, 
which may prevent a deal from being reached.  Second, it is difficult to 
 37.  See supra note 33, at 18. 
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model for the outcome with respect to appraisal claims because it is nearly 
impossible to predict whether, or for what price, a settlement could be 
reached (because petitioners focus on accruing interest) and the amount of 
an appraisal award will remain uncertain for a long time after closing. 
( ) Effect on closing certainty.  Appraisal activism results in increased 
closing uncertainty because the dissenting shareholders cannot vote in 
favor of the merger.  However, appraisal activists must ensure that the deal 
closes.  Consequently, it is currently being debated whether an appraisal 
closing condition (5-10% of the outstanding shares) would be useful.38
Such conditions were common in public company deals 10-15 years ago.39
Both targets and buyers should carefully consider the utility of such 
conditions because they may actually increase the risk that the deal does 
not ultimately close and provide unwanted leverage to the appraisal 
activists.  More useful contractual protections might be a representation as 
to process or a price reduction mechanism linked to appraisal claims.  In 
addition, appraisal litigation leaves buyers with an unquantifiable post-
closing risk that they have to take into account (which poses a major 
problem in leveraged transactions where it is critical for buyers to know in 
advance how much an acquisition is going to cost them) and makes it 
extremely difficult for companies with upside contingencies to sell 
themselves (for example, a biotech company waiting for regulatory 
approval of a new drug). 
Appraisal litigation also impacts the process that surrounds the 
preparation and disclosure of financial projections.  At the initial stage, 
(overly) optimistic sell-side projections, as disclosed in mandatory public 
filings, may invite appraisal activists.  Hockey stick projections are not 
only an issue of fairness of the transaction from a financial point of view.  
They are also a deal issue because the likelihood of the deal receiving 
attention from appraisal activists can have a significant impact on the 
bidding and negotiation strategy of the buyer.  Financial advisors to the 
target company must therefore work with the management of the company 
to develop sell-side projections that present a credible and realistic view of 
the target company’s value but that do not invite appraisal activists, 
including what the board understands about execution risks.  At the stage of 
appraisal litigation, projections play a key role again, as part of the DCF 
analysis.  Given the scrutiny that the projections receive in appraisal 
proceedings, financial advisors should not pick which projections to use for 
their valuation analyses, but should instead request to be directed by the 
 38.  See Fried, Frank, Harris, Shiver & Jacobson LLP, New Activist Weapon—The Rise 
of Delaware Appraisal Arbitrage: A Survey of Cases and Some Practical Implications (June 
18, 2014), supra note 24, at 5. 
 39.  Id.
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board.  Financial advisors and management of the buyer may need to ask 
the target whether and what other projections are being considered by the 
board in evaluating the proposed transaction, and should ask to receive 
those projections, as opposed to applying a “haircut” to the target 
projections.
B.  Other Legal Exit Rights 
There are very few other legal exit rights under U.S. law.  In 
particular, there are no specific legal exit rights in freeze-out scenarios, 
whereby all shareholders are eliminated and the company, if public, is 
delisted (Section 1), and there are no mandatory offers under U.S. law 
(Section 2). 
1. Absence of Specific Legal Exit Rights in Freeze-Out Transactions
The existence of legal exit rights with respect to freeze-out 
transactions depends on the technique used to cash out the shareholders and 
take the company private.  In the vast majority of cases, one of the 
following two techniques is used: (a) a long-form merger with an all cash 
price or (b) a public offer followed by a second-step merger (in the states 
that allow it) or by a short-form merger (allowed in a majority of states).40
It goes without saying that a short-form merger can also be effected 
without a public offer, if the controlling shareholder owns more than 
90%.41
If the freeze-out uses a long-form merger, shareholders have a legal 
exit right pursuant to the provisions discussed above, which are applicable 
to any merger (including those involving public companies because the 
price is, by definition, in cash).  In addition, given the consequences of the 
merger, it is submitted to an entire fairness review by the courts, both as to 
 40.  For more details regarding the freeze-out mechanisms, see Ronald J. Gilson & 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785 (2003); 
Bradley R. Aronstam et al., Revisiting Delaware’s Going-Private Dilemma Post-Pure 
Resources, 59 BUS. LAW. 1459 (2004); A.C. Pritchard, Tender Offers by Controlling 
Shareholders: The Specter of Coercion and Fair Price, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 83 (2004); 
Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 30 (2005); Peter V. Letsou & 
Steven M. Haas, The Dilemma that Should Never Have Been: Minority Freeze Outs in 
Delaware, 61 BUS. LAW. 25 (2005); Michael J. McGuinness & Timo Rehbock, Going-
Private Transactions: A Practitioner’s Guide, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 437 (2005); Clark W. 
Furlow, Back to Basics: Harmonizing Delaware’s Law Governing Going Private 
Transactions, 40 AKRON L. REV. 85 (2007); Mary Siegel, Going Private: Three Doctrines 
Gone Astray, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 399 (2008); Marco Ventoruzzo, Freeze-Outs:
Transcontinental Analysis and Reform Proposals, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 841 (2010). 
 41.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2016). 
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process and price, with the burden of proving entire fairness on the 
defendant, unless the merger is approved by a special committee or by a 
majority of the minority shareholders, in which case the burden of proving 
unfairness is on the plaintiff.  In these cases, appraisal litigation and 
standard M&A shareholder litigation often co-exist. 
If the freeze-out uses a public offer followed by a second-step or 
short-form merger, there are no legal exit rights in connection with the first 
step (the public offer, because the shareholders are free to decide whether 
or not to tender their shares into the offer) but, as we have seen above, there 
are legal exit rights in the second step (the merger).  However, the overall 
transaction is not subject to entire fairness review by the courts if the offer 
is conditioned on approval of a majority of the minority shareholders, the 
merger is effected promptly after the offer on the same terms (including 
regarding the price) and the acquirer made no retributive threats.  Authors 
often criticize the disparate treatment of these two techniques, given that 
they are both used to achieve the same result, namely to eliminate all of the 
shareholders.42
2. Control Share Cash-Out Rights
In three U.S. states, none of which have a significant number of 
incorporated companies, there is a “control share cash-out right,” pursuant 
to which, if a shareholder reaches a certain percentage of the voting rights 
in the company (20% in Pennsylvania, 25% in Maine, 50% in South 
Dakota), the other shareholders may demand that such shareholder 
purchase their shares at a “fair price.”43  These provisions were adopted as 
antitakeover measures.  The main difference with an appraisal mechanism 
(other than the trigger) is that the price is paid by the controller rather than 
the company. 
For example, in Pennsylvania,44 the controller must give notice to each 
shareholder of record, and to the court, promptly following the occurrence 
of a control transaction.45  The notice must state that all shareholders are 
 42.  See Ventoruzzo, supra note 40, at 872 (noting that “this doctrinal outcome has been 
widely criticized by legal scholars and commentators” and classifying the different positions 
expressed on this subject into three major groups:  “(1) authors who object to what they 
consider to be different standards of review for transactions leading to the same result, and 
who therefore argue for convergence toward either entire fairness review or the business 
judgment rule (. . .); (2) authors who approve the current status of Delaware case law; and 
(3) authors who suggest “mixed” approaches”). 
 43.  Practical Law Institute, Public mergers and acquisitions in United States: overview 
(Jul. 1, 2015), http://us.practicallaw.com/2-501-9729 [https://perma.cc/HT5T-X5TV].  
 44.  15 PA. C.S.A. §§ 2541-2548 (2016). 
 45.  Id. at § 2545(a). 
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entitled to demand that they be paid the fair value of their shares and that 
the minimum value the shareholder can receive is the highest price paid by 
the controller within a 90-day period ending on the date of the control 
transaction.  The notice must state the amount represented by such 
minimum value.46
Within a reasonable time after the notice is given (which may be 
specified in the notice), but also prior to receiving the notice, any 
shareholder may make a written demand on the controller to receive “fair 
value” for its shares “as of the date on which the control transaction occurs, 
taking into account all relevant factors, including an increment representing 
a proportion of any value payable for acquisition of control of the 
corporation.”47  The controller is not, however, precluded from offering, in 
the notice or otherwise, to purchase shares of the corporation at any price 
and, conversely, shareholders are not precluded from agreeing to sell their 
shares at any price to any person, including to the controller.48
If the controller and a shareholder are unable to agree on the fair value 
of the shares or on a binding procedure to determine such value within 45 
days after the date of the notice, such shareholder must, no later than 30 
days after the expiration of the 45-day period, (i) surrender or transfer its 
shares to the court, as escrow agent, and (ii) file or join a petition for 
determination of the fair value of the shares.49  Within 30 days from receipt 
of any shares surrendered or transferred, the court appoints an appraiser to 
determine the fair value,50 as well as the “appropriate market rate of 
interest.”51  This is significantly different from the Delaware appraisal 
mechanism, which does not impose the appointment of an appraiser and 
provides for a fixed, statutory, above-market interest rate.  While the 
appraiser conducts its valuation, the controller must make a partial payment 
for the shares surrendered or transferred to the court, equal to the minimum 
value,52 with interest then accruing only for the difference between such 
minimum price and the price determined by the appraiser.  This difference, 
plus interest, must be paid by the controller within ten business days after 
the appraiser’s final determination of the fair value.53
The appraiser’s determination is final and binding on both the 
controller and all shareholders who surrendered or transferred their shares 
 46.  Id. at § 2545(c). 
 47.  Id. at § 2546(a)-(c). 
 48.  Id. at § 2546(d). 
 49.  Id. at § 2547(a). 
 50.  Id. at § 2547(c). 
 51.  Id. at § 2547(f). 
 52.  Id. at § 2547(d). 
 53.  Id. at § 2547(g). 
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to the court, but is subject to judicial review.54  Shareholders retain the right 
to vote and receive dividends until the controller makes the partial 
payment.  Thereafter, the controller has these rights.  However, the fair 
value of any dividends (determined by the appraiser) received by the 
shareholders during this period will be subtracted from the final amount to 
be paid to them by the controller.55  The costs and expenses of the appraiser 
are borne by the controller.56
II. LEGAL EXIT RIGHTS UNDER FRENCH LAW
There are two main types of companies in France: commercial 
companies (which include all public companies) governed by the French 
Commercial Code (FCOC), and civil companies governed by the French 
Civil Code (FCIC).  Both types are frequently used. 
French law focuses on shareholders’ exclusion rather than their right 
to exit.  Consequently, most exit rights are organized contractually and, 
therefore, outside the scope of our analysis.57  French law provides for a 
very limited number of legal exit rights58 and shareholders of public 
companies benefit from more legal exit rights than shareholders of private 
companies, which is a counterintuitive result. 
We analyze first the limited exit rights in connection with certain 
extraordinary corporate events, which are applicable, with few exceptions, 
only to controlled public companies (A).  We then analyze other exit rights 
provided by French law, which are the broad exit rights for shareholders of 
civil companies and variable capital companies (B). 
 54.  Id. at § 2547(f). 
 55.  Id. at § 2547(h). 
 56.  Id. at § 2547(j). 
 57.  The FCOC grants certain forms of companies the right to contractually stipulate 
exit rights.  That is particularly true for a form of commercial company that is specific to 
France, the simplified joint stock company (société par actions simplifiée), where the 
contractual nature is extremely pronounced. 
 58.  For an overview of shareholder exit mechanisms in France, see generally Hélène 
Guebidiang A Tchoyi-Doumbe, La Cession de Droits Sociaux de l’Associé Minoritaire 
(Dec. 16, 2010) (unpublished SJD dissertation, Université D’Auvergne Clermont-Ferrand I) 
(on file with authors); Xavier Fromentin, Les vertus du droit de retrait, LA SEMAINE
JURIDIQUE NOTARIALE ET IMMOBILIERE, Jul. 24, 2009, at 30-34; EMMANUEL GEORGES, ESSAI 
DE GENERALISATION D’UN DROIT DE RETRAIT DANS LA SOCIETE ANONYME (LGDL ed. 
2006); Xavier Grosclaude, Les Droits des Actionnaires Dans les Opérations de Fusion 
(1995) (unpublished SJD dissertation, University of Strasbourg III) (on file with authors); 
Isabelle Sauget, Le Droit de Retrait de l’Associé (1991) (unpublished SJD dissertation, 
University of Paris X) (on file with authors). 
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A. Extraordinary Corporate Events 
There are two categories of extraordinary corporate events that trigger 
legal exit rights in France.  The first category encompasses certain specific 
transactions or corporate events, such as mergers, sales of assets, and 
significant modifications to the bylaws (Section 1).  The second category 
encompasses events related to an ownership threshold being reached by a 
controlling or significant shareholder, in which cases the law permits or 
requires the elimination of the minority shareholders and accordingly 
provides legal exit rights (Section 2). 
1. Exit Rights in Connection with Specific Transactions or 
Corporate Events
(a) Scope.  The French Monetary and Financial Code (FMFC) and the 
regulations adopted by the supervising authority for capital markets, the 
Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), the AMF General Regulation 
(RGAMF),59 created an implied and conditional exit right, as an obligation 
to initiate a buy-out offer (offre publique de retrait) in the following three 
cases:60 (i) mergers with an affiliated company and other extraordinary 
corporate events (art. 236-6(2) of the RGAMF); (ii) significant 
modifications to the bylaws (art. 236-6(1) of the RGAMF); and (iii) 
modification of the legal form from joint stock company (société anonyme)
to SCA (société en commandite par actions) (art. 236-5 of the RGAMF). 
In the first two cases, the obligation to initiate a buy-out offer exists 
only if the company has a controlling shareholder or group of shareholders 
and belongs to such controlling shareholder(s).  In the third case, the 
obligation to initiate a buy-out offer belongs to the controlling 
shareholder(s) of the company prior to the modification of the legal form or 
to the (future) general partners in the SCA.  The notion of control is defined 
in art. L 233-3 of the FCOC.  In general, a company is controlled where a 
shareholder or a group of shareholders owns the majority of voting rights in 
the general meetings or otherwise has the power to appoint or dismiss a 
majority of the members of the board.  In addition, there is a presumption 
that a company is controlled where a shareholder or a group of 
shareholders owns over 40% of the voting rights and no other shareholder 
or group of shareholders owns a higher percentage. 
(i) Mergers with an affiliated company and other extraordinary 
 59.  AMF General Regulation, approved on November 12, 2004, as subsequently 
amended.
 60.  The AMF was authorized to adopt these provisions by art. L 433-4(I)(2) and 433-
4(I)(3) of the FMFC. 
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corporate events.  The following situations might trigger a buy-out offer: 
( ) mergers with an affiliated company; ( ) sale or contribution to another 
company of all or the main portion of a company’s assets; ( ) reorientation 
of the main activity of the company; or ( ) prolonged suppression of 
monetary rights for the shares of the company (art. 236-6(2) of the 
RGAMF). 
We discuss below the scope of each of these four situations.  The first 
situation was included because mergers with an affiliated company are 
inherently subject to conflicts of interest and a special protection of the 
minority shareholders is therefore necessary.  The last three situations were 
included because there is no shareholder vote in these cases, with decisions 
being made by the board of directors.  For this reason, the French 
legislature debated whether to revise the law to impose a mandatory offer 
(instead of a buy-out offer) in these situations, in particular for sales of 
assets.61
( )  With respect to mergers, the provision covers only mergers of a 
company “with the company controlling it or with another company 
controlled by the company controlling it.”62  As such, the scope of the 
provision is limited to mergers between companies controlled by the same 
group (parent-subsidiary mergers or mergers between sister companies).63
 61.  The events that led to the debate were the acquisition of SFR by Altice-
Numéricable and the acquisition of Alstom’s energy division by General Electric.  See
Christian Schricke et al., Consultation publique portant sur le rapport du groupe de 
réflexion sur les cessions d’actifs significatifs [Report on Sales of Significant Assets by 
Public Companies] (Feb. 19, 2015), available at http://www.amf-
france.org/technique/multimedia?docId=workspace:/SpacesStore/0deef39c-7f8c-4913-a889-
6817f3180b41_fr_1.2_rendition [https://perma.cc/EA5Y-BDXE], 11, 17 (noting that absent 
a contrary contractual provision, a sale of the main portion of a company’s assets is not a 
modification of the bylaws and does not therefore require a shareholder vote).  The French 
Code of Corporate Governance provides for a shareholder vote in such a case as a 
recommendation, applicable only to public companies.  The AMF has recently adopted a 
recommendation to the same effect (pursuant to a “comply or explain” approach), including 
enhanced disclosure obligations as to process and price.  See generally Position-
recommandation AMF: Les cessions et les acquisitions d’actifs significatifs-DOC n° 2015-
05 [AMF Recommendation 2015-05 regarding sales and acquisitions of significant assets by 
public companies] (June 15, 2015), available at http://www.amf-
france.org/Reglementation/Doctrine/Doctrine-list.html?category=I+-
+Emetteurs+et+information+financi%C3%A8re [https://perma.cc/NL5N-38D8].  
 62.  Art. 236-6(2) of the RGAMF. 
 63.  Art. 433-4(I)(3) of FMFC referred to any situations when the controlling 
shareholder(s) decided the merger of the controlled company.  Consequently, the obligation 
to initiate a buy-out offer was triggered every time a controlled company merged with 
another company, as there was no requirement that the other company be affiliated with the 
controller(s) in order to trigger a buy-out offer.  In 2010, art. 433-4(I)(3) of the FMFC was 
amended and conformed with the more restrictive scope set forth in the AMF regulations 
that had been adopted to implement art. 433-4(I)(3) of the FMFC. 
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( )  With respect to sales of assets, the provision covers sales of “all or 
the main portion”64 of the company’s assets, and such sales do not need to 
be to an affiliate.  What represents the “main portion” of a company’s 
assets may be difficult to determine, especially if the company operates 
across multiple industries.  Several criteria have been used by the AMF in 
its decisions regarding whether particular sales represented the “main 
portion” of a company’s assets.  A 50% threshold is generally employed.65
The AMF looks not only at the net asset value of the assets sold as 
compared to the total net assets of the company, but also at the financial 
results of the assets (in terms of turnover, revenue, and profit) as compared 
to the aggregate financial results of the company. 
( )  With respect to the reorientation of the main activity of the 
company, a simple change in company ownership or management does not 
trigger a buy-out offer.  To trigger a buy-out offer, the change would have 
to be significant.66  If the reorientation of the main activity is so significant 
as to result in the modification of the main activity listed in the bylaws of 
the company, a buy-out offer would potentially be triggered under the 
separate hypothesis discussed below, regarding any significant changes to 
the bylaws. 
( )  With respect to the suppression of monetary rights, such 
suppression of the monetary rights (dividends) must be prolonged, 
“covering several fiscal years.”67
(ii) Significant modifications to the bylaws.  A buy-out offer might 
also be triggered by “significant” modifications to the bylaws (art. 236-6(1) 
of the RGAMF).  The word “significant” is, perhaps deliberately, vague.  
Three types of modifications are specifically enumerated and therefore 
deemed to be significant: ( ) the legal form of the company; ( ) the 
conditions for the sale and transfer of shares; and ( ) the rights attached to 
 64.  Art. 236-6(2) of the RGAMF. 
 65.  The recent recommendation adopted by the AMF regarding certain sales of assets 
lists five criteria for defining what represents the “main portion” of a company’s assets, of 
which two must be met for the two prior fiscal years.  They all employ a 50% threshold and 
refer to the turnover realized by the asset(s) sold of the company’s total turnover, the sale 
price of the asset(s) of the company’s market capitalization, the net asset value of the 
asset(s) sold of the company’s consolidated balance sheet, the pre-tax profit of the asset(s) 
sold of the company’s pre-tax profit, and the number of employees of the business segment 
sold of the worldwide number of employees of the group.  AMF Recommendation 2015-05, 
supra note 61, at 3.  This recommendation was adopted in a different context than that of 
buy-out offers, but is nevertheless instructive. 
 66.  For a few examples, see ALAIN VIANDIER, OPA, OPE ET AUTRES OFFRES PUBLIQUES 
460 (para. 2397), 463 (para. 2404) (Francis Lefebvre ed., 5th ed. 2014) (noting that the 
modification of the management policy of a portfolio management company or refocusing 
the company’s business towards a different type of assets would be significant changes). 
 67.  Art. 236-6(2) of the RGAMF. 
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shares. 
( )  With respect to the modification of the legal form of the company, 
any such modification would trigger a buy-out offer.  This provision 
applies only to public companies.  The joint stock company and the SCA 
are the only two legal forms available for public companies in France.  The 
transformation of a joint stock company into an SCA is treated as a 
separate case, by art. 236-5 of the RGAMF, discussed below.  The 
transformation of an SCA into a joint stock company is a very rare event.  
Consequently, all other modifications of the legal form will likely mean 
that the company will delist (or adopt a foreign legal form). 
( )  With respect to the modification of the conditions for the sale and 
transfer of shares, this situation will rarely apply because shares of public 
companies must be freely transferable (except for contractual exit rights 
such as a right of first offer). 
( )  With respect to modifications to the rights attached to shares, the 
insertion of a voting cap or the removal of the double voting rights (for 
example, those instituted by the Florange Law68 in 2014), might in theory 
trigger a buy-out offer under this provision, if they are “significant.” 
The three types of modifications specifically enumerated are not 
exclusive.  Furthermore, due to the overlap between the various cases set 
forth in art. 236-6 of the RGAMF, the AMF and its precursors have 
analyzed certain events or changes in light of art. 236-6 of the RGAMF as a 
whole.69  Consequently, other events or changes could trigger a buy-out 
offer, such as divisions; mergers other than with an affiliated company (for 
example, a merger with a private company as the surviving entity); the 
cessation of the company’s status as a regulated entity (for example, 
financial establishment, real estate leasing company, or investment 
company); or the dissolution of the company.70  Similarly, depending on 
the specific circumstances, the transfer of the registered office (for 
example, abroad), or the creation or withdrawal of preferred shares, could 
conceivably also trigger a buy-out offer. 
 68.  Loi 2014-384 du 29 mars 2014 visant à reconquérir l’économie réelle [Law 2014-
384 of Mar. 29, 2014 to Regain the Real Economy], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [JORF] [FRENCH OFFICIAL GAZETTE], Apr. 1, 2014, at 6227.  In order to 
discourage takeovers of French public companies, the Florange Law provided, with 
immediate effect, that owners of registered shares having owned such shares for at least two 
years will have double voting rights in all general meetings.  However, it allowed 
derogations in the bylaws.  As a result, many companies have included as a point on the 
agenda of their annual general meetings the modification of the bylaws in order to remove 
these double voting rights. 
 69.  GUY CANIVET, DIDIER MARTIN & NICOLAS MOLFESSIS, LES OFFRES PUBLIQUES 
D’ACHAT 306 (Lexis Nexis, 2009). 
 70.  See Viandier, supra note 66, at 460 (para. 2397) (providing examples of events or 
changes that could trigger a buy-out offer). 
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(iii) Modification of the legal form from joint stock company to SCA.
The SCA is rarely used in France, but a number of public companies (for 
example, Castorama, Hermès, and Euro Disney) use it as a takeover 
defense due to the dissociation between the management of the company 
(reserved to the general partners, who, in exchange, have unlimited joint 
and several liability for the obligations of the company) and the ownership 
of the share capital of the company (which rests generally with the limited 
partners, who have limited liability for the obligations of the company).71
Because the management of the company belongs exclusively to the 
general partners, buying the shares of the limited partners in a hostile 
takeover does not confer control over the company, as the buyer will not be 
able to manage it.  However, the mere fact that the company is less likely to 
be the subject of a takeover (despite remaining public) reduces the value of 
the shares and consequently the limited partners’ ability to exit the 
company, which explains why a special trigger was provided.72
(b) Procedure. The procedural requirements and AMF’s involvement 
are slightly different, depending on whether the buy-out offer is triggered 
by art. 236-6 of the RGAMF or by art. 236-5 of the RGAMF.  Certain 
common and general requirements also apply. 
(i) Extraordinary corporate events and significant changes to the 
bylaws.  In the cases set forth in art. 236-6 of the RGAMF, the controlling 
shareholder(s) must inform the AMF of the envisioned operation, prior to 
the vote in the general meeting.  The AMF then decides whether the 
initiation of a buy-out offer by the controlling shareholder(s) is necessary.73
In practice, however, either the AMF issues a decision that the initiation of 
a buy-out offer is not required under art. 236-6 of the RGAMF (décision de 
dérogation) or the controlling shareholder(s) voluntarily initiates a buy-out 
offer.
The AMF makes its determination by analyzing “the consequences of 
the envisioned event on the rights and interests of the holders of capital or 
 71.  Art. L. 226-1 and L. 226-4 of the FCOC. 
 72.  Dominique Carreau & Hervé Letréguilly, Offres publiques (OPA, OPE, OPR),
REPERTOIRE DE DROIT DES SOCIETES DALLOZ para. 352, 356-57, 454-59 (2012).  Of the 21 
SCAs listed on Euronext Paris, 16 are family-owned, with a focus on permanent 
transmission of the company within the controlling family (the general partners).  
Consequently, there is generally little to no breathing space for the limited partners. 
 73.  Prior to 2008, the AMF did not have discretionary power to impose the initiation of 
a buy-out offer. Dominique Bompoint, Toutes les Offres de Retrait Ont Désormais Base 
Légale – Commentaire de l’article 153 de la LME, 5 BULL. JOLY BOURSE 357, 360 (2008).  
It could only provide an opinion concerning the opportunity of a buy-out offer and the 
minority shareholders had to request the initiation of a buy-out offer before the competent 
courts (not the AMF).  See, e.g., Cour d’appel [CA] [Regional Court of Appeal] Paris, 
Buckel v. Société du Casino municipal de Cannes, June 25, 1998, note A. Couret, 6 BULL.
JOLY BOURSE 834 (1998). 
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voting rights of the company.”74  The criteria used by the AMF depend on 
the specific case presented to it, but it generally assesses the incidence of 
the event on the activity of the company; the internal organization and 
governance of the company; the liquidity of the shares; the ability of the 
company to pay dividends; and the future of the company.75
For mergers, the AMF also considers the exchange ratio (most 
mergers in the EU are stock for stock mergers)76 and the findings of the 
independent expert. 
For sales of assets,77 if the AMF finds that the assets sold are “all or 
the main portion” of the company’s assets, it then considers the 
consequences of the sale on the shareholders, by analyzing the purpose of 
the sale and the destination of the assets, the sustainability of the 
company’s activity after the sale, or the relationship between the parties to 
the sale.78
(ii) Modification of the legal form from joint stock company to SCA.
In the case set forth in art. 236-5 of the RGAMF, the AMF has only a 
subsidiary role.  A buy-out offer “must” be initiated after the vote in the 
general meeting (contrary to other modifications of the legal form to which 
 74.  Art. 236-6 of the RGAMF. 
 75.  Viandier, supra note 66, at 464-65 (para. 2406-2408). 
 76.  Pursuant to art. 3 and 4 of the Merger Directive, the cash portion of the 
consideration may not exceed 10% of the nominal value of the shares being issued. 
 77.  For three examples where the controlling shareholders sold all the assets of the 
company and initiated a buy-out offer voluntarily (with decisions of conformity rendered by 
the AMF), see AMF dec. 209C1198, Jet Multimedia, Sept. 23, 2009 (the company sold one 
of its subsidiaries controlling the entirety of its “editing and international” division); AMF 
dec. 214C1484, Carrefour Property Development, July 22, 2014 (the company sold two 
assets representing the main portion of its assets to another company of the Carrefour 
group); AMF dec. 214C2672, Compagnie Foncière Internationale, Dec. 18, 2014 (the 
company sold all of its operating assets by liquidating its ownership interest in two 
subsidiaries).
 78.  See, e.g., CA Paris, dec. La Rochette, Apr. 3, 2001, cited in 38 REVUE MENSUELLE 
DU CONSEIL MONETAIRE ET FINANCIER 24, 25 (2001) (approving the decision of the CMF not 
to impose a buy-out offer because, although the assets sold represented more than two-thirds 
of the company’s immobilized net assets, they generated irregular revenue and were subject 
to rapid depreciation); AMF dec. 208C2236, César, Dec. 12, 2008, cited in Viandier, supra
note 66, at 462-63 (para. 2403) (although the assets sold represented approximately two 
thirds of the company’s net assets and turnover, the sale did not trigger a buy-out because 
there were no negative consequences for the shareholders where the sale was court-ordered 
to avoid bankruptcy); AMF dec. 204C1223, Euro Disney, Oct. 13, 2004, cited in Viandier, 
supra note 66, at 461-62 (para. 2401) (the sale of a company’s main assets did not trigger a 
buy-out offer because the assets sold remained in the company’s sphere of control); CMF 
dec. 200C0181, Aérospatiale Matra, Feb. 3, 2000, cited in Viandier, supra note 66, at 460 
(para. 2397-2398) (the operation did not trigger a buy-out offer where the controlling 
shareholders decided to dissolve the existing company and transfer all the assets to a newly-
formed company in exchange for shares of the new company proportional to each 
shareholder’s contribution in the existing company). 
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art. 236-6(1) of the RGAMF applies and which requires the controlling 
shareholder(s) to inform the AMF prior to the vote in the general meeting 
and then gives the AMF discretion to decide whether the initiation of a 
buy-out offer by the controlling shareholder(s) is necessary). 
Another particularity is that the obligation to initiate a buy-out offer 
belongs to the controlling shareholder(s) of the company prior to the 
modification of the legal form or to the (future) general partners in the SCA 
(which will typically be the previous controlling shareholder(s), but could 
also be different persons).  As such, this trigger would be applicable even 
to companies that are not controlled. 
(iii) General requirements.  In all cases, the buy-out offer cannot 
contain any minimal tender condition (a departure from the general rules 
applicable to public offers) and “must be worded such that it may be 
declared conforming by the AMF” (art. 236-6 of the RGAMF) (in order to 
avoid that the controlling shareholder(s) present a buy-out offer that would 
be rejected by the AMF and therefore circumvent their obligation).  As for 
any public offer, the price can consist of either cash or stock (art. 236-7 of 
the RGAMF).  In the latter case, the shares offered in exchange must be 
sufficiently liquid.79  The buy-out offer is carried out by purchases on the 
stock market for a period of at least 10 market days (art. 236-7 of the 
RGAMF). 
The procedure for buy-out offers otherwise follows the general 
procedure applicable to any public offers.  This means that the AMF 
assesses the proposed buy-out offer and renders a declaration of 
conformity.  The AMF does not assess the adequacy of the price (art. 231-
21-5 of the RGAMF).  The price is established by the controlling 
shareholder(s), but, as is the case in any public offer, the buy-out offer must 
set forth the price “based on objective evaluation criteria usually employed, 
the characteristics of the company and the market for its shares” (art. 231-
18(2) of the RGAMF).  The AMF and French courts have imposed the use 
of a multi-criteria approach80 to support the price proposed.81  Although the 
 79.  Carreau & Letréguilly. supra note 72, at para. 443. 
 80.  See Marie-Anne Frison-Roche & Maurice Nussenbaum, Les Méthodes 
d’Évaluation Financière Dans les Offres Publiques de Retrait et les Retraits Obligatoires 
d’Avenir-Havas-Media à Sogénal, 48 REVUE DE DROIT BANCAIRE ET DE LA BOURSE 56 
(1995) (providing an overview of evaluation methods in buy-out offers and forced squeeze-
outs).
 81.  For all public company mergers and sales of assets, the AMF imposes a multi-
criteria analysis, taking into account the market value of the company, profitability 
(capitalization of normalized expected earnings, discounted cash flows, etc.), asset value 
and value comparisons (with similar companies or similar transactions). Position-
recommandation AMF n° 2011-11: Opérations d’apports ou de fusion [AMF 
Recommendation 2011-11 regarding Transfers of Assets and Mergers], July 21, 2011, 
available at http://www.amf-france.org/Reglementation/Doctrine/Doctrine-
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existence of a fairness opinion from an independent expert is only required 
in certain limited cases (for example, if there are conflicts of interest in the 
board), in practice such fairness opinions are frequently included on a 
voluntary basis. 
(c) Frequency of use.  Buy-out offers pursuant to art. 236-5 and 236-6 
of the RGAMF are very rare.  In 2005-2014, the AMF issued derogations 
under art. 236-6 of the RGAMF in approximately 30 cases.  More than half 
of these cases involved mergers, approximately one third involved sales of 
assets and the rest involved the other situations under art. 236-6 of the 
RGAMF.  During the same 10-year period, only 17 buy-out offers were 
initiated pursuant to art. 236-5 and 236-6 of the RGAMF, which amounts 
to less than two per year.82
 2. Exit Rights in Connection with Reaching Certain Ownership 
Thresholds
French law provides for limited exit rights in cases where a 
shareholder reaches certain ownership thresholds.  One relevant threshold 
is 90% or 95% (to which we refer as a squeeze-out context), when several 
mechanisms become applicable, each accompanied by specific legal exit 
rights.  The RGAMF provides for two mechanisms that are applicable 
where a shareholder owns 95% of a company, reserved only to public 
companies.  The FCOM has two mechanisms that involve legal exit rights, 
one for squeeze-out mergers (between a parent company and its 90%-
owned subsidiary), applicable to both public and private companies, and 
another one for bankruptcy proceedings involving certain public and 
private companies.  Finally, another relevant threshold, applicable only to 
public companies, is that triggering the mechanism of mandatory offers, 
which constitutes an indirect legal exit right. 
(a) Squeeze-out exit rights pursuant to the RGAMF.  If a shareholder 
or group of shareholders owns 95% of a public company, two mechanisms 
may be used to eliminate the minority shareholders and delist the company: 
(i) buy-out offers and (ii) forced squeeze-out offers (retrait obligatoire).83
(i) Buy-out offers in a squeeze-out context.  If 95% of the voting rights 
list.html?category=I+-+Emetteurs+et+information+financi%C3%A8re 
[https://perma.cc/DN5W-CDQX].  
 82.  These assessments are based on the authors’ extensive review of AMF annual 
reports from 2005 to 2014 (available at http://www.amf-france.org/Publications/Rapports-
annuels/Rapports-annuels-de-l-AMF/Dernier-publie.html [https://perma.cc/5R43-X7QA]), 
other public and non-public sources, and interviews conducted with AMF personnel and 
French lawyers. 
 83.  The AMF was authorized to adopt these mechanisms by art. L 433-4(I)(1), 433-
4(II), and 433-4(III) of the FMFC. 
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of a public company are controlled by a shareholder or group of 
shareholders, the minority shareholders can request that the controlling 
shareholder(s) initiate a buy-out offer (sell-out right, art. 236-1 and 236-2 
of the RGAMF).  Conversely, the controlling shareholder(s) can also 
choose in this situation to initiate a buy-out offer (buy-out right, art. 236-3 
and 236-4 of the RGAMF).  These rights apply irrespective of the event 
that led to reaching the 95% threshold (a merger, a public offer, or another 
corporate transaction). 
The sell-out right of the minority shareholders in a squeeze-out 
context is very limited.  The AMF has discretion to grant the request of the 
minority shareholders, or not, “in view notably of the conditions prevailing 
on the market in the securities concerned” (art. 236-1(2) of the RGAMF).  
The main criterion used by the AMF in its analysis is share liquidity.84  If it 
grants the request, the AMF then notifies the controlling shareholder(s) of 
the obligation to initiate a buy-out offer, within a deadline that it prescribes 
(art. 236-1(3) of the RGAMF).  Buy-out offers in a squeeze-out context 
(whether as a result of the exercise of a sell-out right or a buy-out right) are 
governed by the same requirements as any buy-out offers, as described 
above,85 with respect to buy-out offers in the context of extraordinary 
corporate events.  Buy-out offers in a squeeze-out context are almost 
invariably followed by forced squeeze-out offers. 
(ii) Forced squeeze-out offers.  This procedure can be used only in 
connection with, and following, a buy-out offer or any other public offer.  
It allows an offeror who, after the offer, owns securities representing 95% 
of the capital or voting rights of the target to squeeze-out the remaining 
shareholders by compensating them for the value of their shares (art. 237-1 
and 237-14 of the RGAMF). 
In the case of a forced squeeze-out following a buy-out offer, the 
controlling shareholder must provide an evaluation of the shares of the 
company: 
pursuant to objective methods used for sales of assets, taking into 
consideration the value of the assets, the benefits achieved, the 
market value, the existence of subsidiaries and the business 
prospects of the company, in each case, pursuant to the 
appropriate weight to be given to each of these elements. 
(art. 237-2(2) of the RGAMF and art. L. 433-4-II of the FMFC).  To 
comply with this requirement, a fairness opinion from an independent 
expert is mandatory (art. 261-1-II of the RGAMF).  Case law has 
 84.  MARIE-CHRYSTEL DANG TRAN & THOMAS FORSCHBACH, CODE PRATIQUE DES 
SOCIETES COTEES 615 (Joly ed., 2nd ed. 2011). 
 85.  See supra Section II.A.1.b.iii. 
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established that the list of criteria is only illustrative in the sense that 
additional criteria may be used (for example, comparisons with other 
companies from the same sector, comparisons with the price offered in a 
prior offer, discounted cash flows, or research analyst estimates consensus) 
and some criteria may not be used (or may be given zero or close to zero 
weight) if they are not relevant or appropriate.86  The price in the forced 
squeeze-out offer must be at least equal to the price in the preceding buy-
out offer, but the AMF may impose a higher price if such increase is 
justified in light of events having influenced the value of the shares since 
the buy-out offer (art. 237-8 of the RGAMF).  Except as noted above, the 
procedure is that applicable to any public offers, which means that the 
AMF assesses the proposed forced squeeze-out offer (including as to the 
minimum price requirement) and renders a declaration of conformity. 
In case of a forced squeeze-out following any public offer that is not a 
buy-out offer, the mechanism is similar.  However, there is no minimum 
price, (art. 237-14(3) of the RGAMF does not cross-reference art. 237-8 of 
the RGAMF) and, in practice, there is no declaration of conformity by the 
AMF, in almost all cases, because an exemption thereof applies.  
Exemptions exist if the price is in cash and equal to the price in the offer 
preceding the forced squeeze-out and if (i) either the forced squeeze-out 
follows an offer that was subject to the normal (as opposed to the 
simplified) procedure or (ii) the forced squeeze-out follows an offer that 
resulted in the AMF receiving an evaluation of the shares of the company 
(the requirements regarding this evaluation are identical to those set forth in 
art. 237-2(2) of the RGAMF and art. L. 433-4-II of the FMFC discussed 
above) and a fairness opinion from an independent expert (art. 237-16-I of 
the RGAMF).87  However, if an exemption from the declaration of 
conformity is not applicable, an evaluation of the shares of the company 
must be provided to the AMF in order to obtain the declaration of 
conformity, and the same requirements apply regarding this evaluation (art. 
237-16-II of the RGAMF). 
The forced squeeze-out procedure is frequently used.  In 2005-2014, 
there were approximately 200 offers followed by a forced squeeze-out.  
This averages out to 20 per year, representing approximately 40% of all 
offers for which the AMF issued declarations of conformity.  Of these, a 
 86.  Carreau & Letréguilly, supra note 72, at para. 507. 
 87.  By a corroborated interpretation of art. 237-2, 237-16-I(2), 237-16-II, and 261-1-II 
of the RGAMF, a fairness opinion from an independent expert is always provided in 
connection with any forced squeeze-out offer, unless one was provided in the offer 
preceding the squeeze-out offer.  Contrary to its prior practice, the AMF cannot presently 
dismiss the results of the independent expert for reasons other than non-respect of the 
applicable legal provisions. 
1094 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:4 
little over half were buy-out offers followed by a forced squeeze-out, and a 
little under half were other public offers followed by a forced squeeze-out.  
However, if we look only at more recent years (2010-2014), buy-out offers 
followed by a forced squeeze-out represented only approximately a third, 
and the rest were other public offers followed by a forced squeeze-out.88
(iii) Correlation with the Takeover Directive.  Both mechanisms (buy-
out offers and forced squeeze-out offers) predate the Takeover Directive 
but have been amended to take into account art. 15 and 16 of the Takeover 
Directive.  Pursuant to these provisions of the Takeover Directive, 
following an offer made to all the holders of securities of the target for all 
their securities, if the offeror reaches a certain threshold (90% or 95%), it 
may require all the remaining holders to sell their securities to it (buy-out 
right) and, conversely, a holder of remaining securities may require the 
offeror to buy its securities (sell-out right), in both cases, “at an equitable 
price.”89
More specifically, the Takeover Directive provides two alternative 
triggers: (i) where the offeror owns securities representing not less than 
90% of the capital carrying voting rights and 90% of the voting rights in 
the target (but member states may set a higher threshold, not to exceed 
95%) or (ii) where, following acceptance of the offer, the offeror has 
acquired, or has firmly contracted to acquire, securities representing not 
less than 90% of the target’s capital carrying voting rights and 90% of the 
voting rights comprised in the offer.  The price in the offer preceding the 
squeeze-out is presumed to be an equitable price in the squeeze-out.  The 
price in the squeeze-out is paid by the offeror (the majority shareholder), 
not by the company.  With respect to the first EU trigger, France opted for 
a 95% threshold, higher than the 90% default threshold, for both 
mechanisms (buy-out offers and forced squeeze-out offers). 
These provisions of the Takeover Directive were imperfectly 
transposed in French law.  Art. 236-3 and 236-4 of the RGAMF, together 
 88.  These assessments are based on the authors’ extensive review of AMF annual 
reports from 2005 to 2014 (available at http://www.amf-france.org/Publications/Rapports-
annuels/Rapports-annuels-de-l-AMF/Dernier-publie.html [https://perma.cc/5R43-X7QA]), 
other public and non-public sources, and interviews conducted with AMF personnel and 
French lawyers. 
 89.  For a discussion of the buy-out and sell-out rights under the Takeover Directive, 
see generally Hubert Segain, Les opérations de Public to Private en France: bilan et 
perspectives, 5 BULL. JOLY BOURSE 536 (2005); Olivier Douvreleur, Un nouveau cas de 
retrait obligatoire: Le Retrait Obligatoire dans la Foulée d’une Offre, 3 REVUE 
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT FINANCIER 58 (2006); Timo Kaisanlahti, When Is a Tender Price 
Fair in a Squeeze-Out?, 8 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 497 (2007); Christoph van der Elst & 
Lientje Van den Steen, Balancing the Interests of Minority and Majority Shareholders: A 
Comparative Analysis of Squeeze-out and Sell-out Rights, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV.
391 (2009). 
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with art. 237-1 to 237-19 of the RGAMF, effectively transpose art. 15 of 
the Takeover Directive by granting the controlling shareholder(s) the right 
to offer and then demand the acquisition of remaining shares from minority 
shareholders.  There are no mirror provisions for the minority shareholders.  
They only have a right to request the AMF to order the controlling 
shareholder to commence a buy-out offer, pursuant to art. 236-1 and 236-2 
of the RGAMF, and we have seen that the AMF has discretion whether or 
not to impose the initiation of a buy-out offer.  As such, minority 
shareholders do not have the means to force the exit (as contemplated by 
art. 16 of the Takeover Directive) and are bound to either the will of the 
controlling shareholder(s) or the discretion of the AMF. 
(iv) Correlation with the delisting mechanism.  The mechanisms of 
buy-out offers and forced squeeze-out offers effectively allow a 
shareholder who owns 95% of a company to achieve its delisting.  
Effective July 2015, French law has introduced a supplemental mechanism, 
that allows a shareholder who owns only 90% of a company to proceed to 
its delisting while granting an indirect exit right to the minority 
shareholders.
Art. 1.4.2 of the special Euronext Rules for regulated French markets 
conditions the delisting on the controlling shareholder having committed to 
buy the shares of the minority shareholders who did not tender their shares 
into the delisting offer, at a price equal to the price in the delisting offer, for 
a period of three months from the closing of the delisting offer. 
(b) Exit right for squeeze-out mergers pursuant to the FCOC.  The 
Merger Directive organizes a protection for minority shareholders in case 
of mergers, in the form of a report from the board, a report from an 
independent expert on whether “the share exchange ratio is fair and 
reasonable,” the right to inspect certain documents, and the right to vote on 
the merger.  The Merger Directive provides that EU member states will not 
impose the first three protections (reports and right to inspect) to squeeze-
out mergers (mergers between a parent company and its 90%-owned 
subsidiary), if three conditions are met: 
(a) the minority shareholders of the company being acquired 
must be entitled to have their shares acquired by the acquiring 
company; 
(b) if they exercise that right, they must be entitled to receive 
consideration corresponding to the value of their shares; 
(c) in the event of disagreement regarding such consideration, it 
must be possible for the value of the consideration to be 
determined by a court or by an administrative authority . . . . 
(art. 28(1) of the Merger Directive).  From the perspective of the 
minority shareholders being squeezed-out, the right set forth in the Merger 
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Directive is only a quasi exit right, because it is subsidiary and 
unenforceable.  It is subsidiary because its activation is exclusively 
dependent on the will of the absorbing company that does not want to 
establish the reports.  It is unenforceable because the sanction in case of 
non-respect is the reactivation of the absorbing company’s obligation to 
establish the reports. 
Art. L. 236-11-1 of the FCOC, which implemented these provisions of 
the Merger Directive, states that if the absorbing company continuously 
owns 90% of the voting rights of the absorbed company (from the 
publication of the draft terms of the merger and until the merger is 
effected), the board and expert reports are not necessary if the absorbing 
company has offered to the minority shareholders of the absorbed 
company, prior to the merger, to buy their shares for a price equal to the 
value of the shares.  Such a price is to be determined: (i) for private 
companies, pursuant to art. 1843-4 of the FCIC (discussed below),90 and (ii) 
for public companies, in a public offer pursuant to AMF regulations.  In 
addition, no reunion or vote of the general meeting of the absorbing 
company is generally necessary.  The reunion and vote of the general 
meeting of the absorbed company remain necessary, even if the vote leaves 
little room for surprises.91
For private companies, the draft terms of the merger often contain a 
provision documenting that the absorbing company has offered to the 
minority shareholders to buy their shares for a certain price (or will offer 
prior to the effective date of the merger), thereby excluding the obligation 
to establish the reports.  Because of the cross-reference to art. 1843-4 of the 
FCIC, the absorbing company and the minority shareholders may freely 
negotiate the price (including based on an expert report voluntarily 
obtained by the absorbing company, outside of the application of art. 1843-
4 of the FCIC).  In case of disagreement (and only in such case) between 
the absorbing company and one or several minority shareholders, an expert 
would be appointed pursuant to art. 1843-4 of the FCIC.  In other words, a 
systematic and prior intervention of an expert is not necessary.92
For public companies, the public offer contemplated by art. 236-11-1 
of the FCIC can take several forms, depending on the specific 
circumstances.  If the controlling shareholder owns 95% of the voting 
 90.  See infra Section II.B.1. 
 91.  Benoît Lecourt, Fusions et Scissions de Sociétés: Transposition en Droit Français 
de la Directive de « Simplification », REVUE DES SOCIETES 654, 658 (2011).  
 92.  Association Nationale des Sociétés par Actions (ANSA), Nouveau régime des 
fusions après la loi de simplification du 17 mai 2011 : questions diverses, 11-057, Oct. 12, 
2011, 7-8 (para. 6).  ANSA also noted that if only certain minority shareholders are in 
disagreement, the appointment of an expert pursuant to art. 1843-4 of the FCIC would not 
invalidate the acceptances previously made by other minority shareholders. 
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rights of the company, it may use the buy-out offers and forced squeeze-out 
offers, discussed above.93  If the controlling shareholder owns more than 
90%, but less than 95%, of the voting rights, it may use a simplified public 
offer, governed by art. 233-1 et seq. of the RGAMF, potentially in 
conjunction with the delisting mechanism, discussed above.94 Simplified 
public offers may be used by controlling shareholders (one of the cases 
expressly enumerated by art. 233-1 of the RGAMF).  They are more time 
efficient than regular public offers95 but have stricter requirements 
regarding minimum price.96
To escape these constraints stemming from the regulations applicable 
to public offers, a shareholder who owns 90% of a company may decide to 
perform the squeeze-out by a merger, in which case it would have to 
provide the reports.  The choice of the best structure might also depend on 
other considerations, such as the fact that the price may only be established 
in stock for mergers, whereas, for public offers, the price can be established 
in stock or in cash (if the price is established in cash, no dilution results). 
(c) Exit right in bankruptcy proceedings pursuant to the FCOC.  In 
August 2015, the French legislature amended the FCOC to add a 
mechanism triggering a legal exit right, which is applicable to certain 
private and public companies that are undergoing bankruptcy proceedings.  
This new legal exit right is not directly related to a shareholder reaching a 
certain ownership threshold, but we discuss it in this section because it is 
triggered by the existence of a controlling shareholder or of a significant 
minority shareholder(s), it is applicable to both public and private 
companies, and it shares certain characteristics with the mechanisms 
applicable in a squeeze-out context. 
Specifically, if a company has more than 150 employees, if the 
discontinuation of the business would cause an impact on employment at 
the national or regional level, and if a modification of the share capital is 
the only “serious solution” allowing the company to continue to operate, 
the court may, among other options, order the holders of a majority of the 
voting rights or of a blocking minority (who refuse such modification) to 
sell their shares.  In this case, all other shareholders have a legal exit right, 
in the sense that they can demand to also sell their shares, simultaneously 
with the forced sale of shares by the majority or blocking minority holders.  
 93.  See supra Section II.A.2.a. 
 94.  See supra Section II.A.2.a.iv. 
 95.  Art. 233-2 of the RGAMF.  A simplified public offer can be limited to 10 days, if 
the price is established in cash, and 15 days, if the price is established in shares. 
 96.  Art. 233-3(1) of the RGAMF.  Absent consent of the AMF, the price offered by the 
controlling shareholder may not be less than the volume weighted average trading price for 
the 60 trading days prior to the publication of the offer. 
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The shares are purchased from the refusing shareholders and from the other 
shareholders that exercise legal exit rights by the person(s) having agreed 
to execute the restructuring plan adopted by the court in the bankruptcy 
proceedings (art. L. 631-19-2 of the FCOC).97  The price is identical for all 
selling shareholders (forced sellers and voluntary sellers).  As such, this 
legal exit right is similar to a contractual right of co-sale or tag-along. 
Contrary to art. L. 236-11-1 of the FCOC, which provides that the 
price is determined pursuant to art. 1843-4 of the FCIC (for private 
companies) or in a public offer pursuant to AMF regulations (for public 
companies), art. L. 631-19-2 of the FCOC provides generally that, absent 
an agreement between the interested parties, the price is established by an 
expert appointed by the court.  It then separately provides that if a public 
company is concerned, the court must consult the AMF prior to ordering 
the sale, and art. L. 433-1 et seq. of the FMFC must be applied (they 
govern public offers in general, including buy-out offers, forced squeeze-
out offers, and mandatory offers).  These provisions raise many questions 
regarding mechanics, especially in the case of public companies where the 
interplay between the mandatory court-ordered sale and the various 
mechanisms provided by the capital markets regulations is particularly 
unclear.
What seems clear, however, is that the lack of a cross-reference (for 
private companies) to art. 1843-4 of the FCIC was deliberate, because art. 
L. 631-19-2 of the FCOC derogates from it by providing that the reference 
date for the evaluation must be the date closest to the sale.  In doing so, it 
addresses ongoing controversy on this point under art. 1843-4 of the FCIC, 
as we discuss in more detail below.98  Moreover, art. L. 631-19-2 of the 
FCOC does not seem to contemplate the possibility (which exists under art. 
1843-4 of the FCIC) for the parties to agree on the expert, because it 
provides in all cases that the expert is appointed by the court.  Furthermore, 
art. L. 631-19-2 of the FCOC contains certain additional precisions that do 
not exist in art. 1843-4 of the FCIC.  For example, it provides that the 
expert must respect the adversarial principle, meaning that both sides must 
be heard, and the same principle applies to the procedure before the court.  
It also provides that the price must be established by the court in the same 
decision whereby the court orders the sale, after receiving the expert’s 
report, and detailed provisions set forth guarantees that the price will be 
paid by the buyer and determine the consequences in case of default. 
(d) Mandatory offers.  The Takeover Directive does not impose an 
 97.  Created by art. 238 of the Loi 2015-990 du 6 août 2015 pour la croissance, 
l’activité et l’égalité des chances économiques [Law 2015-990 of Aug. 6, 2015 for the 
Economic Growth, Activity and Equal Chances], JORF, Aug. 7, 2015, p. 13537. 
 98.  See infra Section II.B.1. 
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obligation that any public offer (voluntary or mandatory; hostile or not) be 
for 100% of the shares of the target company, but imposes the initiation of 
an offer by significant shareholders who cross a certain ownership 
threshold giving them control over the company (individually or through 
concerted action), for 100% of the shares not already owned by the 
significant shareholder(s), at an “equitable price.”  The relevant threshold is 
established by each member state (art. 5(1) and 5(3) of the Takeover 
Directive).  However, if a shareholder reaches the relevant percentage, 
following a voluntary public offer for 100% of the shares of the target, it is 
exempt from initiating a mandatory offer (art. 5(2) of the Takeover 
Directive).  The effect is to create an incentive to make offers for 100% of 
the shares of the target.  These legal provisions represent a protection 
mechanism for all shareholders of public companies characterized by 
dispersed control. 
The Takeover Directive provides that the equitable price is the highest 
price paid for shares of the target company by the offeror during a certain 
period of time prior to the mandatory offer.  The relevant period (of not less 
than six months and not more than twelve months) is to be determined by 
each member state.  Member states may authorize their supervising 
authorities to adjust, upwards or downwards, the equitable price in certain 
exceptional cases, and may also determine the criteria to be applied in such 
cases.  The Takeover Directive enumerates illustratively “the average 
market value over a particular period, the break-up value of the company or 
other objective valuation criteria generally used in financial analysis” (art. 
5(4) of the Takeover Directive). 
Art. L 433-3 of the FMFC and art. 234-1 et seq. of the RGAMF 
transposed art. 5 of the Takeover Directive in France.  The threshold for the 
initiation of a mandatory offer is 30% in France.  More specifically, a 
shareholder must immediately inform the AMF and initiate a mandatory 
offer if, directly or indirectly, individually, or by means of a concerted 
action,99 (i) the shareholder comes to own more than 30% of a company’s 
capital or voting rights or (ii) where it previously owned between 30% and 
50% of the company’s capital or voting rights, the shareholder increases its 
participation by more than 1% of the company’s total capital or voting 
rights during a period of twelve months.  This second trigger, which does 
not exist in the Takeover Directive, was introduced in response to certain 
practices that consisted of launching a mandatory offer at an unattractive 
price, with the sole purpose of surpassing the 30% threshold, and then 
being able to freely accumulate additional shares on the market.100
 99.  See art. L. 233-10 of the FCOC (defining concerted action). 
 100.  Michel Storck & Nicolas Rontchevsky, L’impact de la loi Florange sur le droit des 
offres publiques d’acquisition et les sociétés cotées françaises, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE 
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Pursuant to the Takeover Directive, the “equitable price” in the 
mandatory offer is the highest price paid by the offeror for the securities of 
the company, during a certain period.  France opted for a period of twelve 
months prior to the event triggering the mandatory offer for determining 
the equitable price.  The AMF may request or authorize the modification of 
the price proposed by the offeror if such a measure is justified by a 
manifest change in the characteristics of the company or of the market for 
its securities (for example, in case of a leak of material non-public 
information or grave financial difficulties).  In such cases, as well as when 
there are no purchase transactions of securities of the target company by 
the offeror during the twelve-month period, the equitable price is 
determined based on objective valuation criteria usually employed, the 
characteristics of the company, and of the market for its securities (art. 234-
6 of the RGAMF).  The mandatory offer procedure was sometimes used 
abusively by activist shareholders, leading to certain changes to its 
triggers.101
B. Other Legal Exit Rights 
The only express provision under French law with respect to legal exit 
rights for companies is contained in the FCIC, and is applicable only to 
civil companies, the shareholders of which benefit accordingly from a 
broad legal exit right (Section 1).  French law also contains a broad exit 
right for shareholders of variable capital companies, by virtue of the very 
nature of such companies (Section 2). 
1. Exit Rights for Civil Companies
(a) Scope.  Art. 1869 of the FCIC institutes a general and broad exit 
right for shareholders of civil companies by providing that a shareholder 
may withdraw from a civil company (i) under the conditions set forth in the 
bylaws; (ii) with the consent of all other shareholders; or (iii) for “justified 
reasons,” following a judicial proceeding. 
The first two withdrawal cases reflect contractual exit rights and, as 
such, fall outside the scope of this article.  With respect to the last 
DROIT COMMERCIAL 363, 366 (2014). 
 101.  For example, in the past, a mandatory offer had to be initiated whenever there was 
a change in the control of the significant shareholders of the company.  Because such 
changes were frequent and activist shareholders required the initiation of mandatory offers, 
this provision was repealed in 2011. See CA Paris, Association de Défense des Actionnaires 
Minoritaires v. Pinault-Printemps, Feb. 26, 2002, note M. d’Orazio, 48 REVUE CMF 13 
(2002) (providing an example of a failed attempt to trigger such a mandatory offer). 
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withdrawal case, courts decide on a case-by-case basis and operate a 
distinction between reasons related to disagreements with respect to the 
management of the company and purely personal reasons.  On the one 
hand, courts have held that withdrawal is not “justified” by a disagreement 
concerning the management of the company, if the board acts in the 
exclusive interest of the company (but the non-distribution of dividends for 
several years was deemed a reason justifying withdrawal).  On the other 
hand, courts are more lenient to purely personal reasons, and have 
authorized the withdrawal of a shareholder in case of serious personal debt 
or existence of an excessive non-compete clause.102
(b) Determination of the price.  Art. 1869 of the FCIC provides that 
the shareholder is entitled to receive the value of its shares and, absent an 
agreement of the parties, such value is determined pursuant to art. 1843-4 
of the FCIC.  Art. 1843-4 of the FCIC is the pivotal provision in France for 
the determination of the price to be paid to exiting shareholders in various 
cases.103  It applies as an imperative provision whenever it is cross-
referenced by other legal provisions (for example, art. 1869 of the FCIC or 
art. 236-11-1 of the FCOC) but also, as a subsidiary default provision, in 
other cases.  In 2014,104 this article was profoundly revamped, in order to 
put an end to conflicting case law from French courts.105
The first paragraph of art. 1843-4 of the FCIC provides that when 
another legal provision cross-references it for determining the price of an 
acquisition of shares, the price “is determined, in case of a dispute, by an 
expert appointed, either by the parties, or, if the parties fail to reach an 
agreement, by ordinance of the president of the court, who shall decide by 
way of interim relief proceedings and whose judgment shall be final” (art. 
1843-4(I), first sentence of the FCIC).  Therefore, the parties are free to 
agree among themselves with respect to the price and, in case of 
disagreement regarding the price, with respect to the expert.  The courts 
intervene and appoint an expert only if the parties fail to reach an 
agreement regarding who should be appointed.  Art. 1843-4 of the FCIC is 
 102.  For an overview of French case law, see generally Commentary of Article 1869 of 
the French civil code, CODE DES SOCIÉTÉS DALLOZ 192 (2015). 
 103.  For an overview, see generally Alain Couret & Jacques Moury, Le Nouvel Article 
1843-4 du Code Civil: Tombeau ou Cénotaphe?, D. 2015, 1328; Renaud Mortier, Le nouvel 
article 1843-4 du Code civil issu de l’ordonnance no 2014-863 du 31 juillet 2014, 10 DROIT
DES SOCIETES 13 (2014). 
 104.  Ordonnance 2014-863 du 31 juillet 2014 relative au droit des sociétés, prise en 
application de l’article 3 de la loi 2014-1 du 2 janvier 2014 habilitant le Gouvernement à 
simplifier et sécuriser la vie des entreprises [Government Ordinance 2014-863 of July 31, 
2014 regarding Company Law, adopted pursuant to Art. 3 of Law 2014-1 of January 2, 2014 
Authorizing the Government to Simplify and Protect the Corporate Environment], JORF, 
Aug. 2, 2014, p. 12820. 
 105.  Mortier, supra note 103, at 13-18. 
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also deferential to contractual freedom with respect to valuation methods.  
It provides that the expert “must apply, whenever they exist, the rules and 
methods for determining the value of the shares provided in the bylaws of 
the company or any convention between the parties” (art. 1843-4(I), second 
sentence of the FCIC). 
The second paragraph of art. 1843-4 of the FCIC provides that if exit 
rights (or obligations) result from certain dispositions contained in the 
bylaws, and if the price to be paid is neither determined nor determinable, 
such price will also be determined, in case of disagreement, by an expert 
appointed by the parties or by the court, who “must apply, whenever they 
exist, the rules and methods for determining the value of the shares 
provided in any convention between the parties” (art. 1843-4(II) of the 
FCIC).  Because this paragraph applies to contractual exit rights, we do not 
discuss it below. 
The 2014 revisions to art. 1843-4 of the FCIC resolved a number of 
issues raised by the previous drafting of this provision.  For example, 
courts had held that the imperative nature of this provision prohibited any 
contractual clause that limited the expert’s freedom in choosing the 
valuation methods, even if inserted in the company’s bylaws.106  This 
interpretation was severely criticized.107  In its revised version, art. 1843-4 
of the FCIC adequately responded to the critiques by allowing complete 
contractual freedom with respect to valuation methods.  Consequently, the 
expert will be bound by any contractual valuation methods set forth in the 
bylaws or a shareholder agreement. 
The expert must establish a reference date for the evaluation.  The 
expert could arrive at significantly different results if it values the shares at 
the moment of the exercise of the exit right or at the payment date.  On the 
one hand, the exercise of an exit right could imply that the shareholder 
should not continue to bear the risk of future company value variations, 
because the shareholder has manifested its intent to leave the company.108
On the other hand, the party exercising the exit right remains a shareholder 
until the price is paid109 (having all financial and voting rights associated 
with being a shareholder), and should therefore be subject to any decrease 
in company value during the evaluation.  Before 2010, the first and the 
 106.  See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] com., May 5, 
2009, No. 08-17465, Bull. civ. IV, No. 61 (Fr.), note B. Dondero, D. 2009, 2195 (noting that 
“only the expert will determine the criteria it deems most appropriate to establish the value 
of the shares”). 
 107.  François-Xavier Lucas, Date d’évaluation des parts de l’associé retrayant, 7 BULL.
JOLY SOCIETES 660, 661 (2010). 
 108.  Jacques Moury, Des ventes et des cessions de droits sociaux à dire de tiers, REVUE 
DES SOCIETES 455 (1997).
 109.  Lucas, supra note 107, at 661. 
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third civil divisions of the French Supreme Court opted for the date closest 
to the exercise of the exit right.110  However, in 2010, the commercial 
division of the French Supreme Court opted for the date closest to the 
payment date111 and reiterated its position in 2013 and again in 2014.112
The parties cannot dispute the appointment of the expert by the court 
and the results of the evaluation are definitive, irrevocable and binding to 
the parties, as well as on the court.113  Limited exceptions have been 
allowed by French courts in case of “manifest errors,” such as evident 
calculus errors or a manifest bias towards an interested party.114  Case law 
has indicated that choosing an incorrect reference date constitutes a 
“manifest error.”115
In connection with a shareholder withdrawal, either as a result of art. 
1869 of the FCIC or otherwise, legal interest might be due.  The rate is 
established each semester by decision of the Ministry of Economy.116  For 
the first semester of 2016, the rate is 1.01% if the creditor is a legal person 
or a professional, and 4.54% if the creditor is a natural person.117
(c) Frequency of use.  Art. 1869 of the FCIC is invoked in a non-
negligible number of cases before French courts.  A search on Legifrance 
(one of the most extensive French case law databases) returned thirty-three 
decisions of the French Supreme Court citing this provision between 2010 
and 2015, of which thirteen were rendered with a visa specifically 
referencing art. 1869 of the FCIC. 
2. Exit Rights for Variable Capital Companies
Any form of commercial or civil company, except for joint stock 
 110.  Cass. 1e civ., Oct. 30, 2008, No. 07-19459 (Fr.); Cass. 3e civ., June 12, 2002, No. 
00-22505 (unreported) (Fr.). 
 111.  Cass. com., May 4, 2010, No. 08-20693, Bull. civ. IV, No. 85 (Fr.). 
 112.  See Cass. com., Jan. 15, 2013, No. 12-11666, Bull. civ. IV, No. 9 (Fr.) (establishing 
that “the decision of May 4, 2010 is neither a shift, nor an evolution of an unpredictable case 
law” and that, therefore, the relevant date is that closest to the payment of the exiting 
shareholder); Cass. com., Sept. 16, 2014, No. 13-17807, Bull. civ. IV, No. 130 (Fr.). 
 113.  Cass. com., Nov. 4, 1987, No. 86-10.027, Bull. civ. IV, No. 226 (Fr.). 
 114.  Alexis Constantin, Réforme de l’article 1843-4 du code civil par l’ordonnance n° 
2014-863 du 31 juillet 2014: faut-il s’en réjouir ou s’en inquiéter?, 4 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE 
DE DROIT COMMERCIAL ET DE DROIT ÉCONOMIQUE 633, 633-639 (2014)(Fr.). 
 115.  Jean-Marc Desaché & Bruno Dondero, L’Article 1843-4 du Code Civil et la Date 
d’Evaluation des Droits Sociaux, D. 2014, 2446 (para. 13). See also Cass. com., May 3, 
2012, No. 11-12717 (unreported) (Fr.), note J. Moury, REVUE DES SOCIETES 18 (2013)
(noting that choosing an incorrect reference date constitutes a manifest error). 
 116.  Art. 313-2 and 313-3 of the FMFC. 
 117.  Different interest rates based on the type of creditors were introduced starting in 
2015.
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companies, may be organized as a variable capital company (société à 
capital variable).
The main advantage of a variable capital company is that the share 
capital may be adjusted through simple capital contributions or withdrawal 
of those contributions by the participating shareholders.  Therefore, new 
shareholders can enter the company with no additional formal requirements 
and current shareholders can exit the company in a simplified manner.  
Pursuant to art. L. 231-6 of the FCOC, shareholders of variable capital 
companies can exit “whenever convenient.”  The exit corresponds to a 
reduction of the share capital operated on the balance sheet, with no other 
impact to the company or to its other shareholders. 
III. LEGAL EXIT RIGHTS UNDER ROMANIAN LAW
There are two main types of companies in Romania: commercial 
companies, a type of company which has a distinct legal personality from 
that of its shareholders and is governed by the Romanian Company Law 
(RCL),118 and civil companies, a type of company which does not have a 
distinct legal personality and is governed by the Romanian Civil Code 
(RCC).  Civil companies are rarely used in Romania.  Although no official 
statistics are publicly available, we believe they represent less than 5% of 
all business organizational forms. 
Romanian law provides for exit rights in connection with certain 
extraordinary corporate events involving private and public commercial 
companies (Section A) and several other general legal exit rights for both 
commercial and civil companies (Section B). 
A. Extraordinary Corporate Events 
Art. 134 of the RCL provides that shareholders of a joint stock 
company “who did not vote in favor of a decision of the general meeting 
may withdraw from the company and request the purchase of their shares 
by the company.”  This exit right is also applicable to all other forms of 
commercial companies, including LLCs, but not to civil companies.119  It 
has a very broad scope and covers: (i) mergers and divisions; (ii) the 
change of the main activity of the company; (iii) the transfer of the 
company seat abroad; and (iv) the modification of the legal form of the 
company (art. 134(1) of the RCL). 
 118.  Legea societ ilor nr. 31/1990 [RCL] [Companies Law no. 31/1990], republished, 
MONITORUL OFICIAL AL ROMANIEI [M.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF ROMANIA] 1066, Nov. 17, 
2004, as subsequently amended. 
 119.  Art. 187 and art. 226(1)(a1) of the RCL.  
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The RCL applies to both private and public joint stock companies, but 
only to the extent the Romanian Capital Market Law (RCML)120 and the 
regulations adopted by the Romanian capital markets supervising authority, 
Comisia Na ional  a Valorilor Mobiliare (CNVM) (currently Autoritatea
de Supraveghere Financiar  (ASF)), do not contain contrary provisions.121
As discussed in more detail below,122 the RCML and the CNVM/ASF 
regulations contain such contrary provisions, which are the exclusive 
provisions applicable to public companies.  Therefore, in our opinion, art. 
134 of the RCL is not applicable to public joint stock companies, the scope 
of legal exit rights for extraordinary corporate events involving public 
companies is narrower, and the procedure for the exercise of such legal exit 
rights is governed exclusively by the RCML and the CNVM/ASF 
regulations.
Therefore, we analyze separately legal exit rights in connection with 
extraordinary corporate events involving private (Section 1) and public 
(Section 2) joint stock commercial companies. 
1. Exit Rights for Private Joint Stock Companies
(a) Procedural requirements.  Because of its scarcity, art. 134 of the 
RCL raises more questions than it solves.123  For example, it does not 
specify if the bylaws can modify (by expanding or narrowing) the legal exit 
right and Romanian courts have yet to decide the issue. 
(i) Timing.  The exit right must be exercised within thirty days from 
the date of either the adoption or the publication of the decision of the 
general meeting approving the extraordinary corporate event, depending on 
the trigger (art. 134(2) and 134(21) of the RCL).  It is exercised by 
submitting, at the registered seat of the company, a written declaration of 
withdrawal (art. 134(3) of the RCL).  From the moment of submitting the 
declaration of withdrawal, the petitioner loses its shareholder rights (the 
right to vote and the right to receive dividends), and becomes a creditor of 
the company for an amount equal to the value of the shares.124  Art. 134 of 
 120.  Legea nr. 297/2004 privind pia a de capital [RCML] [Capital Market Law no. 
297/2004], M.O. 571, June 29, 2004, as subsequently amended (Rom.). 
 121.  Art. 290(4) of the RCML. 
 122.  See infra Section III.A.2.a. 
 123.  Ioan Schiau & Monica Iona -S l gean, Retragerea Asocia ilor. Certitudini, 
Dileme, Solu ii, 6 REVISTA ROMANA DE DREPT AL AFACERILOR 24, 26 (2014) (Rom.); 
Arcadia Hinescu, Regimul Juridic al Fuziunii Societ ilor 189-198 (2014) (unpublished SJD 
dissertation, University of Bucharest) (on file with authors) (Rom.). 
 124.  Lavinia Maria Tec, Retragerea Ac ionarului din Societatea pe Ac iuni de Tip Închis 
Reglementat  de Legea nr. 31/1990, 2 PANDECTELE ROMÂNE 29, 32 (2009) (Rom.); Schiau 
& Iona -S l gean, supra note 123, at 29 (note 3). 
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the RCL is silent on the date by which the company must pay the price. 
(ii) Determination of the price.  The price to be paid by the company 
is determined by a registered independent expert, designated by the director 
of the Trade Registry (ORC) upon request of the board of directors (art. 
134(4) of the RCL).  Given that the exit right belongs to the minority 
shareholders, having the expert designated upon request of the board is not 
the best option.  However, shareholders obtain a monetary right by 
submitting their withdrawal demand, and they can enforce that right by 
petitioning the competent court (including if the board does not request the 
designation of an expert).125
The expert must be a member of the National Association of Certified 
Appraisers in Romania, Asocia ia Na ional  a Evaluatorilor Autoriza i din 
România (ANEVAR).  ANEVAR’s members are both natural and legal 
persons, including major audit firms.  In theory, the ORC should maintain a 
list of ANEVAR members willing to perform evaluations under art. 134 of 
the RCL and make appointments randomly from that list.  In practice, 
however, ORC usually appoints the specific expert requested by the 
company.  Some authors believe shareholders cannot dispute the 
appointment of the expert, except when the requirements of registration and 
independence are not met.126  We agree with this view. 
The expert must establish the price as the “average value resulting 
from the application of at least two valuation methods recognized by the 
legislation in force as of the evaluation date” (art. 134(4) of the RCL).  The 
valuation methods currently recognized by the Romanian legislation are 
those adopted by ANEVAR,127 and ANEVAR has adopted, in their entirety, 
the International Valuation Standards (IVS) as Romania’s standards.  
According to IVS 250 (Financial Instruments), there are three main 
valuation approaches: (i) the market approach (which uses the trading or 
 125.  CRISTIAN DU ESCU, DREPTURILE AC IONARILOR (C.H. Beck ed., 2nd ed. 2007) 
(Rom.) at 621; Sorin David, Commentary under art. 134, in STANCIU D. C RPENARU, SORIN
DAVID & GHEORGHE PIPEREA, LEGEA COMENTAT  A SOCIET ILOR COMERCIALE (C.H. Beck 
ed., 2014) (Rom.) at 450 (para. 6) and 452 (para. 9); Tec, supra note 124, at 33; Schiau & 
Iona -S l gean, supra note 123, at 28.  But see, Curtea de Apel [CA] [Regional Court of 
Appeal] Bucure ti, dec. 967, June 18, 2009 (Rom.) (annulling the appointment of an expert 
by the lower court at the request of one of seventeen withdrawing shareholders, despite the 
board having failed to act, due to lack of procedural standing of the shareholder to request 
such appointment).  We disagree with the solution, which might have depended on certain 
particular facts not described in the court’s decision, such as the timing of the shareholder’s 
request, preferences of the other sixteen shareholders, the company having later requested 
the appointment of an expert, etc.  
 126.  David, supra note 125, at 450 (para. 6). 
 127.  Art. 5(1)(c) of Ordonan a nr. 24/2011 privind unele m suri în domeniul evalu rii
bunurilor [Ordinance no. 24/2011 on Certain Measures with Respect to Valuations of 
Assets] M.O. 622, Sept. 23, 2011, as subsequently amended (Rom.). 
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other reported prices of the shares of the company or of similar 
companies); (ii) the income approach (which consists of a DCF analysis); 
and (iii) the cost approach (which typically calculates the liquidation value 
of the company by determining the fair market value of its assets and 
liabilities, and generally results in the lowest value128).
Romanian law is unnecessarily rigid in requesting that the value be 
determined as the mean (average) of at least two valuation methods, instead 
of allowing flexibility to give more weight to the most relevant method(s) 
or use only one method where only one is appropriate.  In contrast, the IVS 
allows experts to use certain variations of the three main approaches (which 
are neither the exclusive ones nor required to be employed in all cases), as 
well as to make adjustments to reflect particular situations.  For example, 
certain valuation approaches are not appropriate in some cases (such as the 
market approach for insolvent companies or the cost approach for well-
established companies).  ANEVAR similarly noted that “all differences 
between two approaches will be justified” and “[e]ach approach will be 
selected taking into account the specific circumstances of the company 
being evaluated, valuation approaches will not just be applied formally and, 
conversely, will not be omitted if they are applicable.”129
There is no express legal provision allowing shareholders (or the 
company) to dispute the results of the evaluation in court.  Interested 
parties can, however, request a re-verification of the expert’s report by 
another expert, pursuant to ANEVAR’s procedures.  They can also petition 
the courts if the formal legal requirements are not met, for example, if the 
expert does not use “valuation methods recognized by the legislation in 
force.”130  This requirement can and should be interpreted broadly by the 
courts.  Courts should review expert reports for “manifest errors” in 
applying the IVS as a whole (not just IVS 250) and verify that the 
appropriate valuation methods were applied, in a reasonable and 
particularized manner.  They may also appoint judicial experts to perform 
another evaluation.131
 128.  Accordingly, ANEVAR noted that, “in our opinion, the minimum price cannot be 
under the value resulting from the Net Liquidation Value [under the cost approach].”).  
Asocia ia Na ional  a Evaluatorilor Autoriza i din România (ANEVAR), Pozi ia oficial  a 
ANEVAR cu privire la evalu rile efectuate conform Legii 151/2014 (pentru delistarea de la 
sistemul de tranzac ionare Rasdaq), Apr. 15, 2015, available at
http://nou.anevar.ro/pagini/pozitia-oficiala-asociatiei [https://perma.cc/AP6F-RWEF].  
 129.  Id.
 130.  David, supra note 125, at 450 (para. 6); Titus Prescure, Commentary under Art. 
134, in IOAN SCHIAU & TITUS PRESCURE, LEGEA SOCIETATILOR COMERCIALE NR. 31/1990.
ANALIZE I COMENTARII PE ARTICOLE, para. 6 (Hamangiu ed., 2009) (Rom.). 
 131.  See, e.g., Înalta Curte de Casa ie i Justi ie [ÎCCJ] [Supreme Court of Romania], 
civ. div. (2nd), dec. 1847, Apr. 25, 2013, discussed in Georgeta Maxim, Procedura de 
Retragere a Ac ionarilor Dintr-o Societate pe Ac iuni i Cump rarea Ac iunilor de c tre
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There is debate among authors regarding the possibility of handling 
withdrawal demands by means of a negotiation between the shareholder(s) 
and the company, as opposed to the price being established solely by an 
expert, and several arguments are advanced by both sides.132  Those against 
determination of the price by negotiation note that the RCL provides for a 
“legal price” which prevents the negotiation of a “contractual price” and 
that the interests of the shareholders who remain in the company could be 
adversely affected.  Those in favor of determination by negotiation note 
that, because the shareholder becomes a creditor once the exit right is 
perfected, it may agree, like any other creditor, to receive a different 
amount than what would be received pursuant to the legal provisions. 
We believe that the price may be established by negotiation, without 
recourse to an expert.  Our view has beneficial practical implications.  
Normally, the evaluation costs are paid by the company (art. 134(5) of the 
RCL).  If no expert is involved, the company, and therefore the 
shareholders collectively, would avoid the burden of the expert’s fee.  
Moreover, if the price is amicably established, the litigation risk decreases, 
resulting in additional savings of attorneys’ fees and judicial costs.  Finally, 
because the RCL does not impose any deadline for the expert to complete 
its evaluation, not having to resort to one would speed up the process, in 
addition to providing certainty to the company as to the amounts that it 
would have to pay.133
Several compelling arguments support our view.  First, determination 
by agreement of the shareholders is possible for LLCs and other forms of 
companies.134  Second, we have seen that under the Merger Directive, 
which provides for a quasi exit right for squeeze-out mergers, agreement is 
possible and recourse to courts or an administrative authority for the 
Societate. Aplicabilitatea Dispozi iilor Art. 134 din Legea Societ ilor nr. 31/1990 în cazul 
Societ ilor Comerciale Admise la Tranzac ionare pe o Pia  Reglementat , 7 REVISTA 
ROMANA DE DREPT AL AFACERILOR 117 (2014) (Rom.) (noting that the court appointed an 
expert to perform another evaluation of the shares because the first evaluator had only 
applied two variations of a single valuation method). 
 132.  See, e.g., Prescure, supra note 130, at para. 7 and note 169 (stating that the price 
can be established by means of negotiation); Drago  C lin, Retragerea Ac ionarilor din 
Societ ile Comerciale pe Ac iuni, 3 REVISTA ROMANA DE DREPT AL AFACERILOR 73, 98-99 
(2011) (Rom.) (also stating that the price can be established by means of negotiation); 
David, supra note 125, at 449 (para. 3), 450 (para. 6) (stating that the price cannot be 
established by means of negotiation); Tec, supra note 124, at 33 (also stating that the price 
cannot be established by means of negotiation). 
 133.  Because the exit right is a form of stock repurchase under the RCL, the company 
may only use its net income or available reserves to pay the withdrawing shareholders.  See
art. 103(1)(d) and art. 104(2) of the RCL. 
 134.  See infra Section III.B.1.
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determination of the price applies only in case of disagreement.135  Third, 
the right to receive the “legal price” pursuant to art. 134 of the RCL is an 
individual right of each shareholder (not a collective right) and any 
shareholder may therefore waive it, provided that such waiver is express.136
Fourth, under Romanian civil procedure law, partial settlements (with only 
some of the parties) are generally allowed in order to prevent or end 
litigation.137  It is true that the interests of the other shareholders could be 
adversely affected in such cases, but such shareholders have several 
mechanisms and claims available for the protection of the rights.138
Finally, practice also confirms our view.  At several companies, the 
decision of the general meeting that approved the extraordinary corporate 
event resulting in legal exit rights also approved the price to be paid to one 
of the shareholders (usually a significant shareholder), pursuant to 
negotiations that had taken place, and established that if other shareholders 
decided to exercise their exit rights, the price to be paid to such additional 
withdrawing shareholders could not be lower than the price paid to the 
shareholder that had negotiated its exit.139  We see no reason why such a 
decision would be invalid.  In particular, this mechanism ensures the 
protection of minority or less significant shareholders adequately. 
Art. 134 of the RCL does not establish as of which date the evaluation 
 135.  See supra Section II.A.2.b and infra Section III.A.1.b.i.  See also art. 28(1)(c) of 
the Merger Directive (providing that “in the event of disagreement regarding such 
consideration, it must be possible for the value of the consideration to be determined by a 
court or by an administrative authority”). 
 136.  Art. 13 of the RCC provides that “[t]he waiver of a right is not presumed.”  One of 
the authors who opposes determination of the price by negotiation admits, however, that 
waiver of the exit right (characterized as a “privilege” granted by the law) or forfeiture of 
the right to receive payment are possible.  See David, supra note 125, at 451 (para. 7) 
(noting that shareholders can waive the legal exit right after submitting a declaration of 
withdrawal and/or can revoke their declaration of withdrawal), 452 (para. 10) (noting that 
shareholders can forfeit receiving payment for the value of their shares). 
 137.  Art. 2267 of the RCC. See also 2268-2278 of the RCC and art. 438-440 of the 
Romanian Civil Procedure Code (governing judicial and extra-judicial settlements). 
 138.  See Prescure, supra note 130, at para. 7 (noting the possibility of bringing a legal 
claim to have the convention annulled if the agreed price is disproportionately high).  Such 
claims could be based, for example, on art. 1361 of the RCL (good faith requirement for 
shareholders) or other anti-fraud provisions.  Moreover, settlements acknowledged by a 
court decision are voidable for the same reasons that all contracts are voidable, following a 
separate legal proceeding (art. 2278 of the RCC). 
 139.  See Autoritatea de Supraveghere Financiar  (ASF), dec. A/735, Dec. 23, 2013 
(regarding Cocor Turism SA), available at
http://www.asfromania.ro/files/capital/sanctiuni/2013/Decizia-ASF-735-2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9YMU-BRRW] (ASF took no issue with respect to the determination of 
the price for the exit of SIF Transilvania, a significant shareholder, by the general meeting, 
and only imposed fines on other grounds).  See also C lin, supra note 132, at 95 (para. 53), 
98-99 (para. 59-61) (referencing this ASF decision). 
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must be made, or when payment is due.  Together with other authors,140 we 
believe that the evaluation must be made as of the date of the event that 
generates the exit right (the date of either the adoption or the publication of 
the decision of the general meeting approving the extraordinary corporate 
event).  However, payment only becomes due when the expert finalizes its 
report.141  Accordingly, (i) for the period between the withdrawal demand 
and the date the expert submits its report, the company will pay, in addition 
to the price established by the expert, “compensatory legal interest” and (ii) 
for the period between the date when the expert submits its report and the 
payment date, “punitive legal interest.”142  Under Romanian law, 
compensatory legal interest is 1.75% (“the reference interest rate of the 
National Bank of Romania”) and punitive legal interest is 5.75% (“the 
reference interest rate plus 4 percentage points”).143  As such, the legal 
interest rate is at approximately market rate for compensatory legal interest 
and significantly higher than market rate for punitive legal interest. 
(iii) Frequency of use.  A sample review of decisions from appellate 
courts and the Supreme Court referencing art. 134 of the RCL indicated 
that the exit right is not infrequently used by shareholders.  For example, in 
2009, there were approximately ten decisions involving shareholders of 
joint stock companies,144 which might seem low in absolute terms but is not 
insignificant given the general low level of shareholder litigation in 
Romania.  As such, it reflects a shareholder demand for mechanisms 
allowing them to liquidate their participation. 
(b) Scope and particularities.  Art. 134 of the RCL covers four 
categories of extraordinary corporate events, each of which presents certain 
particularities.
(i) Mergers and divisions.  The exit right must be exercised within 
thirty days from the date of the general meeting approving the merger or 
division (at this general meeting, the shareholders approve the draft terms 
of the merger or division, which had been previously published).  The fact 
 140.  Schiau & Iona -S l gean, supra note 123, at 30. 
 141.  Id. at 31. 
 142.  See C lin, supra note 132, at 96 (para. 55) (citing Tribunal [Lower Regional Court] 
Bra ov, dec. 140/c, Jan. 20, 2010, applying legal interest), 97 (para. 57). 
 143.  Ordonan a nr. 13 privind dobânda legal  remuneratorie i penalizatoare pentru 
obliga ii b ne ti, precum i pentru reglementarea unor m suri financiar-fiscale în domeniul 
bancar [Ordinance no. 13/2011 regarding the Compensatory and Punitive Legal Interest for 
Monetary Obligations and for the Regulation of Certain Financial and Fiscal Measures in 
the Banking Sector], M.O. 607, Aug. 29, 2011, as subsequently amended, art. 1(2) and 3(1) 
for compensatory legal interest and art. 1(3) and 3(2)-(21) for punitive legal interest. 
Between professionals, the punitive interest rate is even higher, “the reference interest rate 
plus eight percentage points”, which amounts to 9.75%.  
 144.  There were no decisions under art. 134 of the RCL involving shareholders of LLCs 
and other forms of companies. 
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that the exit right may only be exercised after the final approval meeting (as 
opposed to prior to such meeting but after the publication of the draft terms 
of the merger or division) creates a number of technical problems,145
because the exercise of legal exit rights impacts the financial condition of 
the company and, consequently, the share exchange ratio. 
Regarding mergers, shareholders of both companies participating in 
the merger have voting and exit rights, irrespective of which company 
survives in the merger.146  As such, the deadline to exercise exit rights is, in 
theory, different for the shareholders of each company.  In practice, 
however, it is customary for both general meetings to take place on the 
same date, which reduces the problem.  The exit right is very broad and 
covers all types of mergers, regular and squeeze-out mergers (between a 
parent company and a 90%-owned subsidiary).147  It is therefore much 
broader than the quasi exit right set forth in the Merger Directive,148
applicable only to squeeze-out mergers.  As applicable to any mergers, the 
Romanian exit right is nevertheless compatible with the Merger Directive, 
except for the fact that, as discussed above,149 art. 134 of the RCL provides, 
for all types of mergers, that the price is established by an expert appointed 
by the ORC as the first, not the last, resort, and does not expressly allow 
determination of the price by agreement. 
Regarding divisions, the general principles applicable to mergers also 
apply.150  In turn, the general principles applicable to divisions apply to 
spin-offs (referred to in Romanian legislation as partial divisions or partial 
asset contributions or transfers), including the legal exit right.  Practice has 
confirmed that the legal exit right also applies to spin-offs, although, in the 
only reported case regarding the exercise of the legal exit right in 
connection with a spin-off, shareholders ultimately revoked their 
withdrawal demands or liquidated their participations, because the price 
established by the expert was below the trading price.151
 145.  For more details, see David, supra note 125, at 451-52 (para. 8). 
 146.  Cristian Du escu, R scump rarea Propriilor Ac iuni de c tre o Societate 
Comercial  Admis  la Tranzac ionare pe o Pia  Reglementat , 9 DREPTUL 68, 86, 90 
(2010).
 147.  The RCL also provides that the exit right applies to mergers between a company 
and its 100% subsidiary, but that provision is illogical (art. 134(21) of the RCL, cross-
referencing art. 2461(1) of the RCL). 
 148.  See supra Section II.A.2.b. 
 149.  See supra Section III.A.1.a.ii. 
 150.  Stanciu D. C rpenaru, Commentary under art. 2462, in C rpenaru et al., supra note 
125, at 833 (para. 4).
 151.  See C lin, supra note 132, at 76-77 (paras. 10-11) (citing the spin-off of the 
marketing and distribution business segment of OMV Petrom SA and its transfer to OMV 
Petrom Marketing SRL).  The evaluation report of the expert (PricewaterhouseCoopers) was 
not made public.  The price established by the expert was approximately 10% below the 
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(ii) Change of the main activity.  An exit right was provided in this 
case, as well as in the two cases discussed below, because these events are 
likely to result in a loss of the shareholders’ desire to continue in the 
company.152  All these events represent a modification of the bylaws of the 
company.153  In all three cases, the procedure for the exercise of legal exit 
rights is similar to that applicable to mergers or divisions. 
In Romania, the bylaws list the activities of each company by cross-
referencing the relevant categories and code numbers from the 
Classification of Activities of the National Economy (CAEN).  Although 
the terminology is slightly imprecise, only changes of the main activity 
should trigger legal exit rights, as opposed to any changes to the often 
numerous secondary activities listed in the bylaws.  Moreover, only actual
changes of the main activity should trigger legal exit rights and such 
changes would normally be rare.  However, a special situation 
inadvertently triggered this legal exit right in 2008-2010.  When the CAEN 
was revised effective January 1, 2008, companies had to update their 
activities listed in the bylaws to conform to the revised CAEN.  In this 
process, the main activity was also sometimes changed (although there had 
been no factual change in the historic main activity of the company), which 
triggered legal exit rights, even if the change was purely administrative. 
(iii) Transfer of the company seat abroad.  Only a transfer of the seat 
abroad (as opposed to a transfer to a different location within Romania) 
triggers exit rights, possibly because the legislator believed that only such a 
transfer could generate financial and fiscal changes that would justify a 
desire to exit the company. 
(iv) Modification of the legal form of the company.  Differences in the 
rules governing different forms of companies may justify a desire to exit 
the company.  For example, it is more difficult to transfer shares of an LLC 
than of a joint stock company, but, conversely, an LLC has a lower level of 
minimum share capital than a joint stock company.  The law does not 
distinguish based on whether the new legal form imposes more or less 
obligations on the shareholder.  In other words, an exit right would exist 
even if the new legal form were more favorable to the shareholder.  The 
result is counterintuitive at first glance but ultimately the only one possible, 
given that it is nearly impossible to assess whether a particular legal form 
is, globally, more or less favorable to each individual shareholder.154
trading price of the shares of OMV Petrom SA on the BVB.  
 152.  See id. at 75-76 (para. 9). 
 153.  Art. 7(b)-(c) and art. 8(b)-(c) of the RCL. 
 154.  For a discussion of the applicability of the exit right to a change of legal form from 
joint stock company to LLC, see ÎCCJ, com. div., dec. 1673, May 15, 2008. 
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2. Exit Rights for Public Joint Stock Companies
Shareholders of public companies have narrower legal exit rights than 
shareholders of private companies.  They have a limited exit right in 
connection with mergers and divisions, an exit right in case of delisting, 
and a special exit right in connection with the dissolution of the Rasdaq 
market.  In addition, the RCML and its implementing legislation 
(Regulation no. 1/2006)155 provide for squeeze-out exit rights and for an 
indirect exit right through mandatory offers. 
(a) Limited exit right in connection with mergers and divisions.  At the 
time of the adoption of the RCML in 2004, the exit right set forth in art. 
134 of the RCL was limited to three situations: change of the main activity; 
transfer of the company seat; and modification of the legal form.  No exit 
right was provided for mergers and divisions.  The RCML adopted no 
provisions regarding exit rights in these three situations, presumably 
considering that those scenarios are not problematic for shareholders of 
public companies as they can sell their shares on the market, an option not 
available to shareholders of private companies.  Instead, art. 242 of the 
RCML provided an exit right applicable only to shareholders of public 
companies who receive unlisted shares in a merger or division.  As such, 
art. 242 of the RCML operated as a market-out exception.  Subsequently, 
art. 134 of the RCL was amended, and a general exit right covering all 
mergers and divisions was added. 
This addition created much debate regarding what exit rights apply to 
shareholders of public companies.  Most authors note that art. 134 of the 
RCL applies to both private and public companies and that art. 242 of the 
RCML was implicitly repealed.156  There are irreparably conflicting 
decisions from Romanian courts on this issue.157  Just to provide an 
 155.  Regulamentul nr. 1 privind emiten ii i opera iunile cu valori mobiliare [Regulation 
no. 1 regarding Issuers and Securities Transactions], M.O. 312, Apr. 6, 2006, as 
subsequently amended.  
 156.  See, e.g., David, supra note 125, at 453 (para. 13) (noting that art. 242 of the 
RCML, as well as the implementing regulations adopted by the CNVM, were implicitly 
repealed, and art. 134 of the RCL applies to both private and public companies in its 
entirety); C lin supra note 132, at 78 (para. 12); Du escu, supra note 146, at 90-91 (both 
authors note that, as to scope, art. 134 of the RCL applies to both private and public 
companies in its entirety, but as to procedure, art. 242 of the RCML and the implementing 
regulations adopted by the CNVM apply if public companies are involved, to the extent they 
are compatible with art. 134 of the RCL).  But see CRISTINA CUCU ET AL., LEGEA
SOCIETA ILOR COMERCIALE NR., 31/1990, (Hamangiu ed., 2007), at 289. 
 157.  Cases concluding that shareholders of public companies have a legal exit right in 
connection with any of the situations are set forth in art. 134 of the RCL, including any 
mergers or divisions: ÎCCJ, com. div., dec. 2443, June 22, 2011; ÎCCJ, civ. div. (2nd), dec. 
1761, May 20, 2014.  Cases concluding that shareholders of public companies have a legal 
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example, decisions 1761 (from 2004) and 1847 (from 2014) of the ÎCCJ 
involved the exercise of legal exit rights by different shareholders of the 
same public company in connection with the change of its main activity.  
The ÎCCJ decided in the first case that the shareholder could exercise exit 
rights because art. 134 of the RCL applied and in the second case that 
another shareholder could not exercise exit rights because art. 134 of the 
RCL did not apply.  One of the decisions rendered on this topic is also 
noteworthy because it documents one of the few attempts at appraisal 
activism in Romania.  In that case, the withdrawing shareholders had 
purchased shares of the company after the announcement of the merger 
hoping to make a profit by receiving a higher price (following the exercise 
of their legal exit right) than the price they had paid to acquire the shares on 
the market.  The court held preliminarily that the speculative intentions of 
the shareholders were nevertheless “legitimate” because they were based 
on the exercise of a legal right, but concluded ultimately that the 
shareholders were not entitled to exercise exit rights.158
In our view, both before and after the expansion of the exit rights set 
forth in art. 134 of the RCL, shareholders of public companies have had 
and continue to have exit rights only in the limited case set forth in art. 242 
of the RCML, which was neither explicitly nor implicitly repealed.  Our 
view is based on a pragmatic approach.  Shareholders of public companies 
do not need exit rights in those other situations not covered by art. 242 of 
the RCML and, in addition to the situation covered by art. 242 of the 
RCML, shareholders of public companies have an exit right (discussed 
below) when they most need it, in case of delisting. 
Once the scope of the legal exit rights applicable to public companies 
is established, the next question is what procedure applies to the exercise 
thereof.  As adopted in 2004, art. 242 of the RCML (which we believe is 
still applicable) contained no procedural provisions.  It only stated that, in 
the particular case covered by it, shareholders have “the right to withdraw 
from the company and to obtain from the company the value of the shares, 
pursuant to art. [134] of [the RCL].”  In 2006, the CNVM adopted 
procedural provisions (art. 132 and art. 133 of Regulation no. 1/2006), 
which derogate almost entirely from art. 134 of the RCL and significantly 
add to it.  It is debatable whether or not the CNVM could validly adopt 
these provisions, given the cross-reference made by the RCML to the 
exit right only in connection with the situation are set forth in art. 242 of the RCML 
(mergers or divisions, only if unlisted shares are received): CA Gala i, dec. 528, Oct. 5, 
2009 (citing a 2008 interpretation of the CNVM); ÎCCJ, dec. 1847, Apr. 25, 2013 (discussed 
supra note 131). 
 158.  CA Gala i, dec. 528, Oct. 5, 2009 (discussed supra note 157). 
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RCL.159  Our view is that the cross-reference applies only to the last portion 
of the sentence, regarding the determination of the value of the shares (by 
an expert, as the average value resulting from at least two valuation 
methods), and not to the entire procedure set forth in art. 134 of the RCL. 
Consequently, in our view, the implementing regulations are still in 
effect and valid, despite being contrary to art. 134 of the RCL on a 
significant number of points (other than the determination of the price, 
which is not addressed).  They are better tailored than art. 134 of the RCL 
to apply to any mergers of divisions because they solve some of the 
technical issues discussed above, fill the many gaps existing in art. 134 of 
the RCL and result in an expedited process.  For example, the 
implementing regulations provide that the expert160 report is obtained 
before the general meeting called to approve the merger or division, that 
the price determined by the expert is included in the draft terms of the 
merger or division and that the withdrawal demands must be made within 
fifteen business days (not thirty calendar days as is in art. 134 of the RCL) 
from the publication of the draft terms of the merger or division (not from 
the adoption of the decision of the general meeting approving the 
transaction by adopting the draft terms as is in art. 134 of the RCL).  At the 
general meeting to approve the transaction, the board must provide a report 
regarding the exercise of exit rights and the impact thereof on the 
transaction.  The company must pay the price to the withdrawing 
shareholders within seven business days from the date of the general 
meeting approving the transaction (no deadline for payment is set forth in 
art. 134 of the RCL). 
Given the continued uncertainty regarding the scope of legal exit 
rights for public companies, we believe that the legislator should intervene 
to clarify the cases in which such legal exit rights exist and, with respect to 
art. 242 of the RCML, remove the cross-reference to art. 134 of the RCL, 
expressly authorize the ASF to adopt implementing regulations, and amend 
the current implementing regulations accordingly.  That is how the 
 159.  The CNVM did not have express authority to adopt any implementing provisions 
to art. 242 of the RCML, much less to derogate from art. 134 of the RCL (contrary to the 
manner in which this technical aspect was regulated by Law no. 151/2014, discussed 
below).  Nevertheless, the CNVM/ASF have broad regulatory powers, pursuant to their 
statutes and the RCML.  See, e.g., art. 234 and art. 290(2) of the RCML (expressing the 
scope of regulatory authority). 
 160.  The implementing regulations provide that the independent expert will be retained 
by the board and “registered with the CNVM”.  We believe that, given the cross-reference 
to art. 134 of the RCL regarding the determination of the value of the shares, the expert 
must be appointed by the ORC, at the request of the board, and must be a member of 
ANEVAR. See art. 132(2) and art. 133(3) of the Regulation no. 1/2006 (expressing the 
need to retain an expert). 
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legislator acted when adopting regulations in connection with the 
dissolution of the Rasdaq market.161
(b) Exit right in case of delisting.  A public company can be delisted 
as a result of a public offer (potentially followed by the exercise of 
squeeze-out rights, discussed below), made by the controlling shareholders 
or by a third party.  Art. 87(4)(d) of the implementing regulations, adopted 
by the CNVM in March 2006, created an additional mechanism for 
delisting.  It provided that a (extraordinary) general meeting of the 
shareholders could decide the delisting of the shares of a public company, 
with the only requirement being that shareholders are granted an exit right.  
Realizing the potential of abuse by controlling shareholders, the CNVM 
issued an administrative regulation only three months later, in June 2006, 
suspending the application of art. 87(4)(d) of the implementing regulations 
and the related procedural provisions regarding the exercise of the exit 
right162 (art. 1 of Circular no. 8/2006)163 and setting forth an alternative 
mechanism.  The suspension has not yet been lifted. 
The alternative mechanism is to allow a (extraordinary) general 
meeting to decide the delisting of the shares of a public company if the 
shareholders are granted an exit right but only if, as an additional 
requirement to the prior mechanism, the company has very limited trading 
activity (art. 2(I)(a) of Circular no. 8/2006).  Case law held that the CNVM 
could create exit rights not otherwise set forth in the RCML (or the 
RCL).164
Detailed provisions regarding the exercise of the exit right were 
adopted (art. 2(I)(b) of Circular no. 8/2006), which are similar to those 
adopted under art. 242 of the RCML discussed above and which, 
consequently, both derogate from and add to art. 134 of the RCL.  We will 
spare the reader of the technical details and note only that there are detailed 
requirements regarding the independence of the expert (which must be an 
ANEVAR member), the payment of the evaluation costs and the manner of 
informing the shareholders regarding the price established by the expert, a 
longer deadline for the submission of withdrawal demands (forty-five 
calendar days) with a different starting point, as well as a provision that the 
 161.  See infra Section III.A.2.c. 
 162.  For the procedural provisions, see art. 87(5)-(10) of Regulation no. 1/2006. 
 163.  Dispunere de M suri nr. 8 [Administrative Circular no. 8], June 15, 2006 (not 
published in the M.O.), available at http://www.asfromania.ro/legislatie/legislatie-
sectoriala/legislatie-capital/legislatie-secundara-cnvm/regulamente-cnvm/353-2006-
regulamente-capital-legislatie/2432-regulamentul-nr-01-privind-emitentii-si-operatiunile-cu-
valori-mobiliare [https://perma.cc/4VP9-BEBK].  
 164.  CA Bucharest, dec. 2279, Sept. 26, 2007 (aff’d ÎCCJ, dec. 2535, June 18, 2008); 
CA Pite ti, dec. 1/A-C, Jan. 7, 2009; CA Constan a, dec. 151, Oct. 1, 2008; ÎCCJ, dec. 704, 
Feb. 13, 2014 (rev’g CA Bucharest, dec. 3807, June 6, 2012). 
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company must pay the price within fifteen days from receipt of a 
withdrawal demand. 
(c) Special exit right in connection with the dissolution of the Rasdaq 
market.  As a result of prolonged controversy concerning the legal status of 
the Rasdaq market, which was neither a “regulated market” nor a 
“multilateral trading facility” (MTF) in the sense of the EU definitions,165 it 
was dissolved in October 2015 pursuant to Law no. 151/2014.166
After Law no. 151/2014 came into effect in October 2014, the boards 
of Rasdaq companies had to convene general meetings to decide whether to 
list on a regulated market or MTF, or whether to delist.  An exit right was 
granted to shareholders in the following four situations: (i) the general 
meeting decided not to apply for the listing; (ii) the general meeting did not 
adopt a decision due to lack of quorum or the required majority; (iii) the 
general meeting was not convened within the prescribed deadline; or (iv) 
the general meeting decided to apply for listing but the application was 
rejected by the ASF (art. 3, 4 and 7(1) of Law no. 151/2014). 
Law no. 151/2014 provided that the exit right was governed by art. 
134 of the RCL, except for the express derogation that it had to be 
exercised within ninety days (art. 3(2) of Law no. 151/2014), as opposed to 
thirty days under art. 134 of the RCL.  The starting point of the ninety-day 
deadline varied pursuant to which of the four triggers was applicable: the 
publication of the decision of the general meeting that decided not to apply 
for the listing of the company’s shares; the date of the general meeting in 
case of lack of quorum or majority; the expiration of the deadline in the 
third situation and the publication of ASF’s decision in the fourth situation.  
Shareholders were allowed to submit withdrawal requests before or after 
the expert’s report was finalized, provided that the general ninety-day 
deadline was observed. 
The ASF was expressly mandated to adopt implementing regulations 
to Law no. 151/2014 (art. 9(2) of Law no. 151/2014).  The regulations 
adopted by the ASF (Regulation no. 17/2014167) mainly filled gaps in the 
procedure set forth in art. 134 of the RCL, and expedited the process.  For 
 165.  See Case C-248/11, Criminal proceedings against Nila  et al., Mar. 22, 2012, 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-248/11 
[https://perma.cc/NQZ2-GTZ2] (establishing that Rasdaq is not a “regulated market”). 
 166.  Legea nr. 151/2014 privind clarificarea statutului juridic al ac iunilor care se 
tranzac ioneaz  pe pia a RASDAQ sau pe pia a valorilor mobiliare necotate [Law no. 
151/2014 Regarding the Clarification of the Legal Status of Shares Traded on the Rasdaq 
Market or on the Market for Unlisted Securities], M.O. 774, Oct. 24, 2014. 
 167.  Regulamentul nr. 17 privind statutul juridic al ac iunilor care se tranzac ioneaz  pe 
pia a RASDAQ sau pe pia a valorilor mobiliare necotate [Regulation no. 17 Regarding the 
Legal Status of Shares Traded on the Rasdaq Market or on the Market for Unlisted 
Securities], M.O. 870, Nov. 28, 2014. 
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example, the board had to request the designation of the expert by the ORC 
within five days of receipt of the first withdrawal demand (art. 6(1) of 
Regulation no. 17/2014), the expert had to finalize its report within thirty 
days of appointment (art. 6(2) of Regulation no. 17/2014), and shareholders 
were allowed to abandon their withdrawal demands within ten days of the 
expert’s report (art. 6(3) of Regulation no. 17/2014).  It was also provided 
that, in general, the company had to pay the price to the withdrawing 
shareholders within thirty days of the expert’s report (art. 7(1) of 
Regulation no. 17/2014).  The implementing regulations also required 
companies to publish current reports with the key events: receipt of first 
withdrawal demands, appointment of the expert, completion of the expert’s 
report, or the expiration of various deadlines (art. 8 of Regulation no. 
17/2014).  In practice, however, given the lack of clear sanctions, these 
deadlines were not respected by companies, experts, or shareholders. 
Regulation no. 17/2014 also clarified the interplay between the prior 
CNVM regulations regarding delisting in general (Circular no. 8/2006, 
discussed above) and the more recent provisions of Law no. 151/2014.  
Only companies that commenced their delisting procedure pursuant to 
Circular no. 8/2006 prior to November 14, 2014 (by calling a general 
meeting prior to such date) could continue to use it and, otherwise, had to 
use the procedure set forth in Law no. 151/2014 (art. 17 of Regulation no. 
17/2014). 
The dissolution of the Rasdaq market gave rise to a significant number 
of cases where shareholders used their exit right.  In November 2015, the 
ASF indicated that the special legal exit right had applied to 64% of the 
approximately 870 companies that fell under the scope of Law no. 
151/2014.168  At the time of the dissolution of the Rasdaq market, only 
approximately $30 million had been paid to 4,419 shareholders having 
exercised their special exit right, a sign that the saga continues.  At many of 
the companies where the special exit right was triggered, both minority and 
majority shareholders, for various reasons, rejected the evaluation 
reports.169  Many shareholders requested re-verification of the report by 




 169.  This outcome is unsurprising.  Our review of several current reports published by 
companies that were subject to Law no. 151/2014 shows that the evaluation reports are 
generally of poor quality.  These reports are widely divergent regarding the date as of which 
the evaluation is made (which, in our view, should be the date of the general meeting or 
publication of the decision of the general meeting triggering legal exit rights) and the date of 
the financial information of the company used by the expert (which should be as recent as 
possible, meaning that it should not be limited to the most recent annual financial 
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another expert.  In addition, ANEVAR undertook to verify all reports in 
connection with the exercise of the special exit right under Law no. 
151/2014 and inform the ASF about their accuracy.  The ASF has the 
power to impose fines or order other measures, and has exercised its power 
(263 decisions ordering fines totaling over $330,000).170  However, as 
discussed above, there is no express legal provision allowing shareholders 
to dispute the results of the reports in court,171 which is regrettable given 
the multiplication of disputes related to the dissolution of the Rasdaq 
market.  Legislative intervention would be necessary in order to provide 
certainty. 
(d) Squeeze-out exit rights.  Art. 206 and 207 of the RCML have 
implemented art. 15 and 16 of the Takeover Directive, which, as discussed 
above,172 created a buy-out right, and, respectively, a sell-out right “at an 
equitable price” if, following an offer made to all the holders of securities 
of the target for all their securities, the offeror reaches a certain threshold 
(90% or 95%).  Romania opted to increase the threshold from 90% to 95% 
for the first EU trigger. 
The provisions of the RCML regarding squeeze-out exit rights are 
poorly drafted and not perfectly aligned with the Takeover Directive.  
Some of the problems were resolved by the implementing regulations,173
sometimes contra legem.  Others persist.  The implementing regulations set 
forth a convoluted and relatively long procedure for the exercise of 
squeeze-out exit rights and payment of the price by the majority 
shareholder (we will spare the reader the technical details), not reflecting a 
full understanding of the rationale behind the mechanism, which is to 
information).  We also noticed that the market approach is rarely used, presumably because 
it is more challenging and time-consuming than the other two.  If only the other two 
approaches (the income approach and the cost approach) are used, some experts determine 
the price as the average of the two values, and some disregard the value obtained under the 
cost approach, which ANEVAR indicated should be regarded as the “minimum price” (see 
supra Section III.A.1.a.ii), and establish the price to be paid as that resulting under the 
income approach. Finally, there does not appear to be any pattern of the price established by 
the expert being generally higher or lower than the trading price on the relevant date. 
 170.  For an example, see ASF dec. 1933, Aug. 17, 2015, available at
http://www.bvb.ro/info/Raportari/THNI/THNI-
Decizia%20ASF%20nr.1933%20din%2017.08.2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/87F5-FPQG] 
(regarding Tehnoton SA Ia i, a company delisting from Rasdaq).  After a notification 
received by the ASF regarding the quality of the evaluation report for a company delisting 
from the Rasdaq market, ANEVAR reviewed the report and concluded that there were 
multiple inaccuracies and that the “level of credibility is zero” such that the report should 
not be updated by the same expert.  The ASF agreed and ordered the board of the company 
to request the appointment of a new expert by the ORC to prepare a new report. 
 171.  See supra Section III.A.1.a.ii. 
 172.  See supra Section II.A.2.a.iii. 
 173.  Art. 74 and 75 of Regulation no. 1/2006. 
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eliminate the few remaining shareholders both fast and easily.  We note 
only that, where the presumption regarding the equitable price does not 
apply and intervention of an expert is necessary, the implementing 
regulations clarify that the related costs are paid by the minority 
shareholder if a sell-out right is exercised, and by the majority shareholder 
if a buy-out right is exercised.174   Takeover activity is extremely limited in 
Romania, and these provisions are not often invoked.  When they are 
invoked, it is generally by the majority shareholder (buy-out right). 
(e) Mandatory offers.  Art. 202-205 of the RCML transposed art. 5 of 
the Takeover Directive in Romania.175  Pursuant to these provisions, the 
threshold for the initiation of a mandatory offer is 33%.  Shareholders who 
were already above the 33% threshold of voting rights when the Takeover 
Directive was implemented in Romania must initiate a mandatory offer 
only if they reach or exceed a higher threshold, 50% of voting rights (art. 
203 of the RCML), but the RCML does not otherwise impose a mandatory 
offer where an already significant shareholder augments its participation by 
small percentages over time. 
Romania opted for a period of twelve months prior to the mandatory 
offer for determining the equitable price (the highest price paid for shares 
of the target company by the offeror during this period), and also 
established subsidiary criteria if the price cannot be established in this 
manner, which are (i) the volume weighted average trading price during the 
twelve months prior to the mandatory offer; (ii) the net asset value of the 
company, pursuant to the last audited financial statements; and/or, (iii) the 
value of the shares, pursuant to an expert valuation performed in 
accordance with international valuation standards (art. 204 of the RCML).  
In practice, the price is often established as the highest value between the 
equitable price and the prices derived using the three subsidiary criteria.  
Finally, Romania exempted from the mechanism of mandatory offers 
certain transactions that result in the 33% threshold being surpassed, such 
as privatizations of state-owned enterprises (art. 205 of the RCML). 
B. Other Legal Exit Rights 
In addition to the legal exit rights discussed above (in connection with 
extraordinary corporate events), Romanian law establishes general exit 
rights for commercial companies, other than joint stock companies, 
(Section 1) and for civil companies (Section 2). 
 174.  Art. 74(6) of Regulation no. 1/2006 and art. 207(3) in fine of the RCML. 
 175.  See supra Section II.A.2.c. 
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1. Exit Rights for Commercial Companies Other than Joint Stock 
Companies
(a) Scope.  Pursuant to art. 226 of the RCL, a shareholder may also 
withdraw176 from companies other than joint stock companies (LLCs and 
other forms of commercial companies): (i) in the cases set forth in the 
bylaws, (ii) with the consent of all other shareholders, or (iii) if there are no 
provisions in the bylaws or when the unanimous consent cannot be 
obtained, for “justified reasons” following a judicial proceeding.177
The first two withdrawal cases reflect contractual exit rights and, as 
such, fall outside the scope of this article.  With respect to the last 
withdrawal case, “justified reasons” are not only strictly financial reasons, 
but also other fundamental changes affecting the company (for example, a 
change in control or in the structure of the board) or purely personal 
reasons (for example, major disagreements with other shareholders).178
(b) Determination of the price.  The value of the shares to be paid by 
the company can be established by agreement of the shareholders or by an 
expert appointed either by the shareholders or the court.  Here, contrary to 
art. 134 of the RCL, the principle is amicable determination of the price, 
and recourse to an expert is the solution of last resort.  But, as is the case in 
art. 134 of the RCL, the evaluation costs are paid by the company. 
(c) Frequency of use.  We performed a sample review of decisions, 
 176.  Art. 222 to art. 225 of the RCL provide a procedure for the exclusion of a 
shareholder in these forms of companies.  In case of exclusion, art. 224(2) of the RCL 
provides that the excluded shareholder is entitled to an amount that represents the value of 
its pro rata share of the company’s assets. 
 177.  By drawing a parallel between these additional withdrawal cases for other forms of 
commercial companies, an author noted that withdrawal of shareholders of joint stock 
companies would also be possible, in addition to the situations expressly set forth by 
Romanian law, in the following particular case.  See David, supra note 125, at 448 (para. 2) 
(noting that if (i) the certificate of incorporation contains certain share transfer restrictions, 
(ii) the shareholder has “justified reasons” for wanting to withdraw, and (iii) the other 
shareholders are blocking the shareholder from transferring its shares, if an agreement 
among the shareholders with respect to withdrawal is not reached, the aggrieved shareholder 
could petition the courts to have the certificate of incorporation rescinded (only with respect 
to the aggrieved shareholder), and the courts could establish the appropriate consideration to 
be paid to it by analogy with art. 134 or art. 224(2) of the RCL, or by applying other criteria 
deemed relevant).  We agree that an exit right for shareholders of joint stock companies 
would be useful in the scenario described by this author, but the law (absent future 
modifications) limited the exit for “justified reasons” to companies other than joint stock 
companies, and we do not believe such limitation to have been inadvertent. 
 178.  See ÎCCJ, civ. div. (2nd), dec. 262, Jan. 29, 2014 (noting that, in case of 
disagreements with the other shareholders, a shareholder can request withdrawal in court 
pursuant to art. 226(1)(c) of the RCL, even if the bylaws of the company provide that 
withdrawal requires the consent of all other shareholders). 
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from appellate courts and the Supreme Court, referencing the specific exit 
right set forth in art. 226 of the RCL (applicable only to LLCs and other 
forms of companies).  For example, in 2009, there were approximately 
thirty-four decisions, which indicates frequent use.  When compared with 
the results of our review of decisions from 2009 referencing art. 134 of the 
RCL, discussed above,179 it shows that exit rights are used three times more 
frequently by shareholders of LLCs and other forms of companies than by 
shareholders of joint stock companies.  This result is in line with the fact 
that shareholders of joint stock companies can transfer their shares more 
easily than shareholders of LLCs and other forms of companies (having, 
therefore, less utility for legal exit rights),180 and, as we have seen, have 
narrower exit rights. 
2. Exit Rights for Civil Companies
The RCC establishes certain general exit rights, not circumscribed to 
any specific situations, applicable only to civil companies.  The 
requirements for exit are more lenient if the civil company is established 
for an unlimited period of time.  These provisions came into effect in 2011 
and have been rarely (if at all) invoked until now. 
(a) Civil company established for an unlimited period of time.  Art. 
1926 of the RCC provides that a shareholder may withdraw if two 
conditions are met: (i) the shareholder must offer reasonable notice and act 
in good faith, and (ii) the withdrawal must not cause imminent damage to 
the company.  There are no provisions concerning an obligation of the 
company to pay the value of the shares of the withdrawing shareholder.  
However, such an obligation should exist, especially if the shareholder 
contributed to the share capital.  Authors have noted that the shareholders 
could reach an agreement as to the price, or that the value could be 
determined by an expert (appointed either by the shareholders or the 
court).181
(b) Civil company established for a limited period of time.  Art. 1927 
of the RCC provides that a shareholder may withdraw if two conditions are 
met: (i) there are “justified reasons” for the withdrawal and (ii) the majority 
of the remaining shareholders consent.182  Absent such consent, the 
 179.  See supra III.A.1.a.iii. 
 180.  Piperea, Commentary under article 226, in C rpenaru et al., supra note 125, at 776 
(para. 16). 
 181.  Gheorghe Piperea, Commentary under article 1926, in Flavius-Antoniu Baias et 
al., NOUL COD CIVIL. COMENTARIU PE ARTICOLE 2090 (para. 4) (C.H, Beck ed., 2nd ed., 
2012).
 182.  Carolina M. Ni , Commentary under article 1927, in M d lina Afr sinie et. al.,
NOUL COD CIVIL. COMENTARII, DOCTRINA SI JURISPRUDEN A 296 (para. 1) (Hamangiu ed., 
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shareholder can petition a court, which may authorize the withdrawal after 
analyzing “whether there are legitimate and justified reasons, the 
opportunity of the withdrawal in the circumstances and the good faith of 
the parties”.183
In all cases, the shareholder is responsible for any damages caused to 
the company by its withdrawal.  In our opinion, this provision does not 
exclude the obligation of the company to pay the value of the shares of the 
withdrawing shareholder, and the shareholders could reach an agreement as 
to the price or the value could be determined by an expert (appointed either 
by the shareholders or by the court).  The company’s obligation to pay the 
value of the shares to the shareholder could be off-set, totally or partially, 
against the shareholder’s obligation to pay for any damages caused to the 
company by its withdrawal.184
IV. COMPARATIVE REMARKS
The structure of legal exit rights in each of the three countries 
surveyed, pursuant to the terminology and analytical frame developed in 
this article is presented in the table below.  Below, we further discuss 
certain particularly important general findings (Section A) and specific 
points of comparison on certain sensitive and detail-oriented aspects 
(Section B). 
A. Overview of Main Findings 
Our main findings relate to the correlation between legal exit rights 
and, on the one hand, the strength of capital markets (Section 1) and, on the 
other land, the level of shareholder litigation (Section 2). 
1. Assessment of Correlation with Strength of Capital Markets
Our analysis indicates that the scope of legal exit rights for public 
companies is not correlated with the strength of capital markets.  For 
example, legal exit rights for public companies have a similar scope in all 
three countries analyzed, although there are major differences between the 
strength of their capital markets.  Shareholders of public companies in the 
U.S. (especially if we take into consideration only Delaware companies) 
benefit from fewer legal exit rights that shareholders of Romanian or 
2012).
 183.  Art. 1927(2) of the RCC. 
 184.  Art. 1617 of the RCC provides for the automatic off-set of monetary obligations, 
under certain conditions. 
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French public companies, despite having the most active and liquid capital 
markets.  Shareholders of French public companies benefit from a 
relatively broad scope of legal exit rights if the company has a controlling 
shareholder (in lieu of the U.S. “entire fairness review”), but the exercise of 
these legal exit rights is generally subject to the discretion of the AMF.  
Shareholders of Romanian public companies have legal exit rights in 
connection with certain mergers and divisions, as well as in other cases that 
lead to the delisting of the company.  Lastly, there is no mandatory offer 
mechanism in the U.S., under either federal or most state laws, while public 
company shareholders in Romania and France can sometimes benefit from 
indirect legal exit rights as a result of mandatory offers. 
Our analysis also indicates, as was to be expected, that shareholders of 
private companies are granted a broader scope of legal exit rights than 
shareholders of public companies.  France represents the notable exception 
from this conclusion.  France offers almost no legal exit rights to 
shareholders of private commercial companies (other than in connection 
with squeeze-out mergers, or in the particular case of companies in 
bankruptcy proceedings), but any private company (commercial or civil) 
may be organized as a variable capital company, in which case legal exit 
rights are not necessary. 
The three countries analyzed are widely divergent regarding the legal 
exit rights applicable to joint stock companies as opposed to LLCs and 
other forms of commercial companies.  In the U.S. and France, there are 
practically no legal exit rights for LLCs and other forms of commercial 
companies, because contractual exit rights are often found in the bylaws or 
in shareholder agreements.  In Romania, there are extremely broad legal 
exit rights for LLCs and other forms of commercial companies (similar to 
those for civil companies).  Furthermore, our research indicates a frequent 
use of legal exit rights in these types of companies, almost three times 
higher than the use of legal exit rights by shareholders of joint stock 
companies. 
With respect to civil companies, the use of this legal form is very 
different in the three countries analyzed.  There is no direct equivalent in 
the U.S.  In Romania, there are very few civil companies, whereas in 
France the civil company is a legal form used very frequently.  Both 
countries provide for a general legal exit right (in addition to contractual 
legal exit rights) for “justified reasons”, following a judicial proceeding.  
The Romanian and French provisions are very similar but, because the 
Romanian provisions are relatively recent, they have not yet been fully put 
to test and are very infrequently used.  In contrast, there is robust case law 
in France on this subject, which could serve as useful guidelines for 
Romanian courts in the future. 
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Finally, our review indicates that the degree of state intervention 
regarding the determination of the price is higher in all three countries for 
joint stock companies than for LLCs and other forms of companies, 
including civil companies.  For the former, various mechanisms lead to a 
rigid method of determining the fair price (appraisal statutes in the U.S. 
requiring court intervention, mandatory intervention of an expert appointed 
by the director of the ORC in Romania), especially when public companies 
are concerned (in which case strict capital markets regulations often 
determine the method for calculation of the fair price).  For the latter, 
where legal exit rights are available, the price can be freely negotiated by 
the parties and court intervention occurs only in case of disagreement. 
2. Assessment of Correlation with Shareholder Litigation
Our analysis indicates that the frequency of use of legal exit rights is 
not proportional with the level of shareholder litigation. 
Although the U.S. procedure regarding legal exit rights suffered no 
modifications in the last 50 years, its hidden benefits (above-market interest 
rate, fair price frequently at a premium to the merger price, favorable 
timing, informational advantages, etc.) were discovered only recently.  This 
“Eureka!” moment resulted in a dramatic and constant increase, since 2011, 
in appraisal activism.  Despite this increase, the level of appraisal litigation 
remains significantly lower than the general level of standard M&A 
shareholder litigation involving public companies. 
In France, although there is a general increase in shareholder activism, 
legal exit rights remain narrow in scope and infrequently litigated.  
Appraisal activism is unlikely to develop. 
Romania has low shareholder litigation in general but there is 
significant litigation in connection with legal exit rights, regarding private 
companies (due to illiquidity of the market for private stock), but also, 
more recently, regarding public companies (due to the legal exit rights 
triggered in case of delisting, such as the numerous delisting procedures 
caused by the dissolution of the Rasdaq market).  The explanation for the 
significant legal exit rights litigation in Romania is most likely that the 
provisions governing legal exit rights have not recently and thoroughly 
been reassessed, and, in this area, the devil is in the details, as can be seen 
from the recent developments that took place in the U.S.  Appraisal 
activism could develop in the future. 
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B. Particular Findings 
1. Extraordinary Corporate Events that Trigger Legal Exit Rights
Although the types of companies to which legal exit rights in 
connection with extraordinary corporate events apply differs (private 
companies principally in the U.S. and Romania, and public companies only 
in France), the categories of extraordinary corporate events that trigger 
legal exit rights are quite similar in all three countries. 
For mergers and divisions, Romania offers a broad and unrestricted 
legal exit right.  The U.S. and France limit the scope of the legal exit right 
by providing conditions regarding the corporate structure of the company 
(the existence of a controlling shareholder or of a squeeze-out context) and 
the type of merger or division (a legal exit right will only exist if 
shareholder approval is necessary for the transaction). 
Significant sales of assets (spin-offs) trigger exit rights in MBCA 
states and in a majority of non-MBCA states (if shareholder approval is 
necessary), but, significantly, not in Delaware.  They also trigger legal exit 
rights in France and Romania. 
As for other extraordinary corporate events, both the U.S. (in MBCA 
states, but not in Delaware) and France offer a somewhat general legal exit 
right for modifications of bylaws (articles of incorporation), while Romania 
lists specifically the three modifications that trigger legal exit rights 
(change of the main activity, transfer of the company seat abroad, and 
modification of the legal form).  This is in line with the tendency observed 
in Romania to regulate legal exit rights in a rigid and formulaic manner. 
2. Determination of Fair Price
The method for determining fair price is the key element with respect 
to legal exit rights, and controls the utilization and use of these rights by 
shareholders.  We discuss below the qualifications and mandate of the 
experts that typically intervene (a), the valuation methods that can or must 
be used by the experts, or by the courts (b), the possibility of determining 
the price by negotiations or settlements between the shareholders and the 
company (c), and the interest rate that is added to the price and which many 
authors deem to be the most important factor for the current rise in 
appraisal activism in the U.S. (d). 
(a) Experts.  Various scenarios lead to the involvement of independent 
experts in all three countries.  The legal definitions of “expert” and 
“independence” vary from country to country.  In the U.S., valuations are 
typically performed by investment banks or appraisal firms, who are 
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subject to various regulatory requirements.  France does not require a 
formal registration with any particular authority, but requires compliance 
with certain requirements as to expertise and independence.  Romania, in 
accordance with its general tendency to overregulate, provides that experts 
must be registered members of ANEVAR and must use ANEVAR’s 
valuation standards. 
In the U.S., each party to the appraisal litigation proceedings employs 
its own expert and the ultimate determination as to fair price is made by the 
court, after reviewing all the evidence presented before it.  The court may 
substitute its own judgment for that of the experts.  In France, the expert 
can generally be designated by mutual agreement of the parties or, in case 
of disagreement, by the court.  The findings of the expert are binding on the 
parties.  In Romania, except for the cases where the parties may designate 
an expert by mutual agreement, the expert is appointed by the director of 
the ORC, and the parties only have a limited right to dispute the 
appointment, on grounds of lack of registration or independence.  There is 
also no express legal provision allowing shareholders (or the company) to 
dispute the results of the evaluation in court, having only a possibility to 
request a re-verification of the expert’s report by another expert.  After 
reviewing the U.S. and French mechanisms, we have argued that the 
possibility to dispute the results of the evaluation should be recognized in 
Romania, and some courts have agreed to hear such complaints and 
sometimes appointed their own expert. 
(b) Valuation methods.  Experts have various degrees of freedom in 
choosing and applying valuation methods in the three countries.  We 
observed that a higher degree of freedom in this respect appears to generate 
a better protection of the minority shareholders.  For example, in Romania, 
which has very precise provisions regarding the determination of the price, 
discontent among the shareholders about the results of the evaluations is 
common. 
The valuation methods are basically the same in all three countries, 
because the IVS is an international and well-known standard, of U.S. 
descent.  The IVS provides for three main valuation approaches: the market 
approach, the income approach and the cost approach.  Its application is 
mandatory only in Romania but the same methods are applied on a 
voluntary basis by American and French experts.  A DCF analysis 
(corresponding to the income approach) appears to be the valuation method 
privileged by shareholders, experts and courts in all three countries. 
In the U.S., courts have discretion to employ a wide range of methods 
to determine the fair price, and often rely on a DCF analysis.  For French 
private companies, the law allows broad party interference with the 
valuation methods (for example, parties can establish the criteria to be used 
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by the expert and the reference date for the evaluation).  In contrast, for 
French public companies, regulatory constraints are severe, and each 
mechanism has specific requirements regarding the fairness of the price, 
with a corresponding control from the AMF.  In Romania, the fair price 
must be determined as an average value resulting from the application of at 
least two valuation methods recognized by the law, which are those stated 
in the IVS.  This severely and unnecessarily restricts the evaluation 
procedure, and has been shown to lead to a poor quality of evaluation 
reports.
(c) Negotiations.  In the U.S., after the appraisal litigation commences 
(or, in certain U.S. states, as a pre-condition to the availability of appraisal 
rights), parties are free to negotiate the price and enter into a settlement.  In 
France, parties are generally free to negotiate the price (except where a fair 
legal price is imposed, which is generally the case for public companies) 
and it is only in case of disagreement that courts intervene.  In Romania, 
there is debate regarding the possibility of determining the exit price by 
means of a negotiation between the shareholders and the company (as 
opposed to the price being established solely by an expert).  We have 
argued that, in our view, such a possibility, which has beneficial practical 
implications and exists in the other countries analyzed (as well as in EU 
regulations), should also be recognized in Romania. 
(d) Legal interest.  Given that the mechanisms for obtaining payment 
of the fair price can sometimes take a long time, the applicable legal 
interest rate is important for the shareholders in deciding whether or not to 
pursue the exercise of legal exit rights. 
In the U.S., interest is added to the fair value determined by the court, 
from the effective date of the merger and until payment.  The default 
(statutory) interest rate in Delaware is 5% over the Federal Reserve 
discount rate, and therefore significantly above-market.  The interest rate is 
identical irrespective of whether the petitioner is a natural or a legal person.  
The Court of Chancery has never exercised its discretion to establish a 
different interest rate, and the Delaware legislature is not currently 
contemplating a modification. 
In France, the current legal interest rate is 1.01% if the creditor is a 
legal person or a professional, and 4.54% if the creditor is a natural person.  
It is therefore readily apparent that the exercise of legal exit rights is less 
appealing to institutional investors in France. 
In Romania, the legal interest for the period between the withdrawal 
demand and the date the expert submits its valuation is 1.75%, and the legal 
interest for the following period and until payment of the price is received 
is 5.75%, for both natural and legal persons.  The interest rate for this 
second period is significantly higher than market rates in Romania.  
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Combined with a broad legal exit right for mergers, and given the 
illiquidity of both public and private markets for stock, this interest rate 
creates the necessary premises for the development of appraisal activism in 
Romania.  As we have seen, attempts at appraisal activism already 
occurred.
CONCLUSION
In all three countries analyzed, legal exit rights are currently being 
exercised more and more frequently, and are raising passionate debates, 
commentary and litigation. 
Our analysis indicated that the scope of legal exit rights for public 
companies is similar in all three countries analyzed but that there is a major 
discrepancy between the U.S. and Romania, on the one hand, and, on the 
other hand, France, regarding legal exit rights for shareholders of private 
companies (in the first two countries, shareholders of private companies 
have broader legal exit rights than shareholders of public companies, while 
in France we have the exact opposite situation).  It is normal for 
shareholders of public companies to have fewer legal exit rights than 
shareholders of private companies, because they have the ability to sell 
their shares on the market if they are dissatisfied with the management or 
the plans of the company.185  Our analysis also indicated a major 
discrepancy regarding exit rights for LLCs as compared to joint stock 
companies.  For LLCs, there are almost exclusively contractual exit rights 
in the U.S. and France, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, broad legal 
exit rights in Romania. 
Given these national variations, our study can serve as a basis, in all 
three countries, for reassessing the appropriate scope of legal exit rights 
depending on the type of company (private versus public, LLC versus joint 
stock company) and rethinking where to draw the border between legal and 
contractual exit rights. 
 185.  It is also normal for shareholders of public companies to have fewer contractual 
exit rights than shareholders of private companies because significant minority shareholders 
of private companies are typically able to negotiate additional protections and rights, 
including exit rights. 
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APPENDIX
